

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Title: Creating and Sustaining a Whole Community in Hierarchical Institutions

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Lani Roberts

In this thesis, I examine some of the relationships between hierarchy and community that exist in institutions. Within institutions, individuals are separated from one another and organized hierarchically based on arbitrary inequalities. In general, I discuss inequalities based on race, class, gender, sexual orientation, age, ability, etc. Institutions organized based on arbitrary inequalities cannot create and sustain a whole community since such inequalities result in hostile or coercive treatment of individuals based on characteristics or criteria over which they have no control. If it is true that people want and/or need community, then it matters a great deal for us to know whether or not community can exist in hierarchical institutions, since certain kinds of hierarchies interfere with building and sustaining community. I explain how the concept of “whole community” allows for the unity of unequal beings, provided that the inequalities are based on merit. Furthermore, I describe two fictitious institutions. One, Cloister University is organized on the basis of arbitrary inequalities. The other, Mores University is a whole community, organized on the basis of merit.

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Creating and Sustaining a Whole Community in Hierarchical Institutions

By  
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I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any reader upon request.

  
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Christian G. Matheis, Author

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project is the product of the last seven years as a student, four undergraduate and three graduate. During that time, I have been a part of many interesting institutional developments, which have benefited my personal and professional growth. However, as an individual in a hierarchically organized institution, I have been a member of several communities that have given me a sense of affirmation and belonging for which I am far more grateful.

I thank my family and friends who have by no means stood on the sidelines of this project. In fact, they have been the examples that my notions of community are based on. They have put up with my infrequent contact, and they have been patient with my personal growth. They never doubted I could finish this thesis, and I consider their reasons for continually asking “what next?” as a sign of encouragement. Whatever comes next, I’ll do my best to call more often.

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## DEDICATION

This is dedicated to "Baby P," my sister's first child who is due to arrive in a few months... My generation is just getting warmed up, and we've got a lot of work to do, but we probably won't be able to solve the big problems we've inherited, although some of us will try anyway. So, take a lot of ethics classes, think critically, question authority, and do your best.

**Creating and Sustaining a Whole Community  
in Hierarchical Institutions**



## **Chapter 1 - Introduction**

If the study of ethics has provided me with anything compelling, it is that we should find a way for individuals to be as different and unique as possible, while at the same time remaining connected to one another in the best interests of all. Furthermore, it is my belief that our connections to one another are at their best when we are part of a community. Yet, a need exists within and beyond social sciences to explore the idea of community in institutions. In our society, many, if not all institutions are organized using hierarchies. For example, governments, corporations, families, and schools are organized hierarchically. In our society, we also claim to have community. Examples of community can be found in schools, corporations, neighborhoods, colleges and universities, and in many other places. However, it may be the case that some hierarchies interfere with creating and sustaining community. If this is true, community may or may not exist in such places. Exploring this idea, we may have to acknowledge that what we want to believe is a community may not actually be a community.

In this thesis I examine relationships between hierarchy and community that exist in institutions. These relationships are important to consider because, as I discuss the thoughts of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in Chapter Two, people need community in order to fulfill their potential as human beings. If it is the case that certain kinds of hierarchies interfere with building and sustaining community, and if it is true that people need

community, then it matters a great deal for us to know whether or not community can exist in hierarchical institutions. Determining this will be a goal of this thesis.

In order to explore and understand the relationships between hierarchies and community, it is necessary to have consistent definitions for “hierarchy,” “community,” and “institution.” Throughout this thesis, each of these concepts, “institution,” “hierarchy,” and “community” should be understood as processes. There is a temporal, serial aspect to each. By this I mean that over time they change, grow, and develop through social processes. For instance, although institutions may be resistant to change, they do change. Just as our society is not static, these processes are also dynamic. I will discuss the work of sociologist Ian Robertson in order to use a common understanding of the term “institution.” He provides four different characteristics of institutions, which I discuss in Chapter Two.

For a definition of “hierarchy,” I draw from an article by Philosopher Lani Roberts titled “Difference and Hierarchy.” Biologist Uko Zylstra’s work helps to explain some of the different kinds of hierarchies used to organize institutions. In general, I discuss two categories, which include Control and Taxonomic hierarchies. I modify the two hierarchies from Zylstra with concepts of arbitrary and merit-based criteria and describe two subcategories, Arbitrary and Merit-Based hierarchies, which produce Arbitrary-Control and Arbitrary-Taxonomic hierarchies as well as Merit-Based-Control and Merit-Based-Taxonomic hierarchies.

Community, as I explain further in Chapter Two, is centered on I-Thou relationships as defined by Martin Buber. I use a definition of “community” from “Josiah Royce on Self and Community,” in which Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley examines the theories Josiah Royce published on community. Kegley also provides a synopsis of Royce’s three conditions for the existence of community. These conditions apply to individual members within a community and a person must be capable of experiencing and/or acting them out in order for any other qualities of community to be possible. For my purposes, I will refer to them as, “individuality,” “intersubjectivity” and “unity;” these are my own labels for each term. I provide an exegesis of all three conditions, and explain their importance to this thesis. In addition to individuality, intersubjectivity, and unity, there are also six subconditions that Royce gives for his definition of community. I call these subconditions “voluntariness,” “cooperation,” “collaboration,” “progress,” “integration,” and “kinship.” I also add two of my own subconditions. One, “equality,” is based on ideas from John Rawls. The other, “care,” comes from Nel Noddings. In Chapter Two I will explain my understanding of each condition and subcondition, and I will explain how they are to be used in this thesis.

Following the definitions I have discussed above, in Chapter Two I review four different theories of community. These are, *Gemeinschaft and Geselleschaft* by Ferdinand Tönnies, “Anarchic Community,” from *Community, Anarchy and Liberty* by Michael Taylor, *Mestizo Democracy* by John Francis Burke, and “Communitarianism” from *The Spirit of Community*

by Amitai Etzioni. In addition to summarizing the concepts of community and hierarchy in institutions from each of these theories, I will explain how they relate to my thesis, and the limitations of each. In particular, I focus on matters of authority and diversity within communities.

In Chapter Three, I argue that communities can exist in institutions organized by hierarchies. I will also show the benefits and limitations that exist for different communities in such contexts. The main problem I address is that individuals may want and/or need to be a part of a community that extends throughout a given institution, but certain kinds of hierarchies prevent individuals from being in a larger “whole community” with one another. I argue that the solution to the problem involves a change in the way that our institutions are organized. In order to have community, institutions cannot be organized by hierarchies that classify or distinguish between people or groups of people based on certain arbitrary criteria, such as race, gender, sexual orientation, age, ability, etc. The alternative I suggest is to use hierarchies based on merit, which, as I argue, do not interfere with building and sustaining community.

As we consider the relationships that exist between hierarchies and community it is necessary to provide examples of different social institutions in which both hierarchies and community may exist. This will allow us to apply our understanding of hierarchy and community. In Chapter Three, I describe two imaginary institutions. One, called Cloister University, is organized much like most institutions in our society. The hierarchical

structures within the fictitious institution are such that they prevent the possibility of having a whole community of individuals and communities. The other, Mores University, is a model of how we can use merit-based hierarchies so that what I call a “whole community” is possible within institutions. I continue from there to discuss the importance of educating individuals throughout a given institution about the harm caused by organizing individuals into arbitrary-based hierarchies, and I also show how institutions that are whole communities serve to provide individuals and communities with freedom from such harm.

Responding to some of the possible ways to reject the idea of whole community, in Chapter Four I include several key points about the importance of using our ethical imaginations. For us to attempt to create whole community within institutions, we must do something other than dwelling on our flaws, convincing ourselves that to try is not worth the effort. Instead, we must be willing to imagine the possibility of such an achievement, imagining our potential as human beings in community with one another. Ultimately, we may have to consider whether or not the absence of whole community is a result of generations of numbed ethical imaginations and moral laziness. The process of bringing about the kind of community I describe in this thesis will not be easy. We should not expect it to be. Morality between individuals, as you will read in the chapters ahead, requires effort. It is no different in community, which requires an active investment in imagining the deep and valuable reality of our neighbors and our acquaintances. However, even if we,

as a society, have forgotten some of the wisdom of creating and sustaining communities it does not mean that we cannot exert the effort to move toward a better future.

## **Chapter 2 - Institution, Community and Hierarchy**

### **Introduction**

In order to explore whether community is possible in hierarchically organized institutions, I will give the definitions and supporting criteria for the three terms central to this thesis then I will explore four related theories of community in order to provide a foundation for my views. The three terms I will define are “institution,” “community,” and “hierarchy.” I will provide a detailed explanation of the criteria underlying each. Following these definitions, the four theories I will explore are *Gemeinschaft and Geselleschaft* by Ferdinand Tönnies, “Anarchic Community,” from *Community, Anarchy and Liberty* by Michael Taylor, *Mestizo Democracy* by John Francis Burke, and “Communitarianism” from *The Spirit of Community* by Amitai Etzioni. In addition to summarizing the concepts of community and hierarchy in institutions from each of these theories, I will explain how they relate to my thesis.

### **Institution**

Here, I begin the framework for my thesis by providing a brief definition for “institution.” Sociologist Ian Robertson tells us, “an institution is a stable cluster of values, norms, statuses, roles, and groups that develops around basic social need” (93). He then gives us four characteristics of institutions. First, institutions are resistant to change. According to Robertson, resistance to change is often functional, as it can ensure social

stability. He also tells us that during times of social conflict or rapid social change resistance may become dysfunctional if the institutions have become outmoded, ineffectual, or even oppressive (93).

The second characteristic of institutions in a given society is their interdependence. Often, similar values and norms of a given society circulate throughout major institutions; institutions share common features with one another and tend to reflect compatible goals and priorities. Because of this interdependence, institutions can serve as a microcosm of the larger society to some extent (93). Third, institutions also tend to change together; they do not change in isolation. Robertson maintains that significant modifications in one institution are likely to influence similar or related changes in other institutions if they are all to remain integral to society (93).

Finally, the functions of institutions are centered on the needs of a given society, and the failure of an institution is usually regarded as a problem by that society which would be unable to meet the needs of individuals. Robertson tells us that institutions tend to represent the status quo. Some groups benefit and some groups suffer under any institutional arrangement. In other words, certain groups will not be able to see that their needs are met in the same ways that other groups do. Furthermore, because of the difference in benefit or cost that institutions maintain between groups, there is often controversy between groups over the need for change as well as the rate and direction of change (93). In Chapter Three, I will discuss institutions as the



means by which groups meet their needs, the way I think institutions should be organized, and the implications for community.

Because Robertson's definition of institutions is broad, it can encompass many different aspects of society. For example, an institution can be a government office or department with a rigidly established structure, organization, and purpose even if its internal and external relationships and behavioral patterns are left undefined. An institution can also be the family with established relationships, structures and behavioral patterns even if there are less rigid purposes and practices.

### **Community**

Community should be understood in the context of real and/or potential relationships between people. I will show that an understanding of community cannot occur without critically considering the implications for our relationships with one another. While society is composed of formal boundaries, such as national, state, and county borders, it is not the same case with community. "Community" is less formal, and more abstract. In "Josiah Royce on Self and Community," Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley examines the theories Josiah Royce published on community. I begin with Royce's definition of "community" and amend it, as needed. Kegley writes: "Royce defines community as a 'being that attempts to accomplish something in and through the deeds of its members'" (42). There are several conditions required for community and I will return to these soon.

In this section, I will discuss community generally and I will examine community in three different contexts. First, we can consider the conditions necessary for community from the experience of individuals who interact with other individuals. In a second context, we can consider the conditions when communities interact with other communities, potentially within a larger community of communities. Finally, in a third context, we can consider the conditions when communities, a community of communities, and individuals interact in hierarchical institutions.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. tells us of the need human beings have for community. In "An Experiment in Love," he says that we have a need for belonging to the best in the human family, and that all life is interrelated, thus all of humanity is involved in a single process (Washington 19-20). Speaking in terms of the need for a nonviolent approach to social change, he says that "[...]anyone who works against community is working against the whole of Creation" (Washington 20). "If I meet hate with hate, I become depersonalized, because creation is so designed that my personality can only be fulfilled in the context of community" (Washington 20). The need for community is such that is found in all human beings (Washington 19). When human beings are without community, they become depersonalized. In his own words, "whether we call it an unconscious process, an impersonal Brahman, or a Personal Being of matchless power and infinite love, there is a creative force in this universe that works to bring the disconnected aspects of reality into a harmonious whole" (20). I define community in this thesis, as

Dr. King describes it, with the understanding that it is a need experienced by all human beings, without which we cannot become whole persons.

In "Intersubjectivity and Cultural Creativity," Martin Buber explains that

the real essence of community is undoubtedly to be found in the—manifest or hidden—fact that it has a center. The real origin of community is undoubtedly only to be understood by the fact that its members have a common relationship to the center superior to all other relations: the circle is drawn from the radii, not from the points of the periphery (98).

I understand the "center" Buber describes as consistent with Josiah Royce's definition of community. In other words, I believe that the kind of community Royce defines has a center and, to explain the center of community, I draw from Martin Buber's *I and Thou*, in which he describes two different kinds of relationships between human beings, "I-Thou" and "I-It." If individuals relate to one another as I-It, that is object-to-object, both are objects (*I and Thou* 3-6). In I-It relationships, individuals only acknowledge certain parts of others, such as skin color, physical ability and gender. In consequence, when humans relate to one another as I-It, neither are persons. It is then possible to exert hostile and coercive treatment upon one another, both objectified. However, human beings have the ability to understand one other as subjects. In I-Thou relationships, individuals relate to one another as unique, dynamic beings; whole beings who are more than the sum of their parts. Moreover, there can be no "I" unless there is also a "Thou" with whom to interact such that both individuals gain new levels of self awareness as relational beings (*I and Thou*

8-9). It is from the context of I-Thou relationships that community can be created and sustained. Thus, in this thesis, the foundation for community will be that it is built upon relationships in which individuals relate to one another as I-Thou.

In a similar and more explicit manner, Royce maintains that community must be composed of "selves" who give meaning to their own lives. These individuals must choose their own goals, be unique and have the ability to search for meaning beyond their own personal plan. Community also requires individuals who resist conformity to mere social will, and in fact needs individuals who develop their own self-will in contrast to social will. Kegley explains, "By being truly individual, the self contributes most to the wealth of the community" (40). When necessary, I will refer to this first condition as "individuality."

Community requires attentive listening to the ideas and hopes of others. According to Royce, community is the product of interpretation, a distinct mental activity that exists as a form of knowledge in addition to perception and cognition (Kegley 40). Kegley explains that

the crucial elements in interpretation, then, are: (1) Respect and regard for you and Royce as "selves," as dynamics of ideas, purposes, meanings, pursuits; (2) will, the will to interpret, which involves (a) a sense of discontent and dissatisfaction both with partial meanings, a narrowness of one's own view of things, and with estrangement from others as carriers of meanings and ideas, and (b) an aim to unite selves; "I seek to bring the three of us into the desired unity of interpretation"; and (3) reciprocity and mutuality. There is willingness to play one's part in the interpretive process. The listener to whom the interpretation is addressed must be kindly and sympathetic. What is gained from a process of interpretation is both self-knowledge and

community [...] community because our isolation has been transcended; a new vision and an experiential conspectus have been achieved (41-42).

I will refer to this second condition as “intersubjectivity.”

The third condition for community requires that individuals actually achieve some kind of unity. They must share a common past and/or a common future. A community becomes “a community of memory, and/or a community of hope” (Kegley 42). I will call this condition “unity.”

Kegley has given us our introduction to the definition of “community.” The three conditions from Royce that she outlines are those that individual members, called “selves” by Royce, must experience for community to be possible. If it were the case that individuals were not capable of experiencing individuality, intersubjectivity and unity, then community would not be possible.

Another important point for understanding Royce’s definition of community is that uniqueness is required from those who comprise community. Kegley tells us that

Royce declares, “a community does not become one... by virtue of any reduction or melting of these various selves into a single merely present self or into a mass of passing experience.” In a true community there must be shared understanding and cooperation, a genuine intersubjective interaction and sharing (42).

As Kegley explains, the experiences of the members of a community are shared through interaction. Recalling what I have already said about the center of community, this idea is consistent with I-Thou relationships. In community, we are not liquefied in such a way that our individual uniqueness

is minimized or eradicated. We are all unique subjects and the individual is preserved to the benefit of the entire community. If individuality is not preserved, true community could not exist. This can be understood as the difference between the “melting pot” and “salad bowl” concepts of cultural diversity. In a melting pot, each ingredient loses its original distinction as it becomes assimilated into the whole. However, community is like a salad bowl in which ingredients retain their original composition as they are dispersed throughout the mixture. Later in this chapter when I discuss “Mestizo democracy,” this idea will be developed further.

In addition to individuality, intersubjectivity, and unity, there are also six subconditions that Royce provides for his concept of community. These subconditions are necessary for understanding “community” as it is used in this thesis. Thus, I will explain each subcondition and give each a label.

True community requires that participation is voluntary. Each individual must participate in the community freely. Cooperation and involvement in the community must be self-directed. Each member must be able to take action with conscious and free choice (Kegley<sup>42</sup>). I refer to this first subcondition as “voluntariness.” In other words, participation as a member of the community cannot be compulsory. For instance, someone who is employed in a school to teach may willingly choose to consider herself or himself a “teacher.” However, this does not mean she/he will consider herself or himself a teacher as far as “teachers” are a community. In other words, she/he will still be a teacher, but may not join the community of teachers.

True community requires an aware and active cooperation by its members. Each individual must have an awareness of other members of the community and must relate to the acts of others in cooperation. They must correct, encourage, and enjoy others' acts (Kegley 42). I will call this second subcondition "cooperation." In other words, within a community the members are aware of the actions of one another and actively cooperate with them. Because of this awareness, the members can actively regulate the standards of the community. For instance, consider a basketball team to be a community. Each member is aware of the actions of the other teammates. This awareness allows team members to communicate with one another in order to cooperate based on the standards of the team, for example what is and is not acceptable behavior.

The third subcondition I will call "collaboration." True community must have collaboration among members. Each individual must recognize the necessity of collective work. There must be an awareness that coordinated efforts are required in order for the community to achieve its goals (Kegley 42-43). The efforts of each member must be mutually appreciated. By appreciation, I mean that each member of the community makes contributions and enjoys the recognition of the other members of the community, and vice versa. Among community members, mutual appreciation for one another exists in association with contributions. The contributions in this case would be any and all deeds done by members that facilitate the community achieving all or part of a community goal or purpose. For example, we can think of a

club or a student group working to plan a large event to be held on a university campus. Members might have different tasks assigned to them. The overall goal is accomplished through the involved efforts of individual members -- booking space for the event, hiring caterers, making decorations, etc. Each community member can recognize and appreciate the work done by other members. Even if each has not witnessed every action, the final product is evidence of the different contributions by each member.

True community requires progress in order to survive. Each individual must recognize cooperative acts as a part of the community's future life and hopes (Kegley 43). Individuals and the community as a whole must not be preoccupied with the present. Stagnation compromises the community's ability to achieve its goals. Community must, therefore, be evolving and future-oriented. I will refer to the fourth subcondition as "progression." In other words, the members of the community are committed to the progress of community for its own sake, whatever that may be, given a particular community. To maintain progress, "What's in it for *me*?" is replaced with "What's in it for *our* future?" Perhaps you will recognize this concept as the fable of the ant and the grasshopper. The hardworking ant spends the long hot summer preparing with the rest of the ant colony for the winter. The grasshopper does not, instead choosing to play away his time during the sunny weather. When winter comes, we find the ant colony well-fed, safe, and warm. The grasshopper is left out in the cold without food and shelter to die or seek the charity of those who, like the ants, wisely prepared.



True community is integrated in such a way that members include something shared by the entire community as part of their own individual identity, and the community is composed of something from each member (Kegley 43). Each individual must identify her/his own life with the common life of the community; individuals must have community goals as a part of their own goals. I will call this subcondition "integration." In other words, community invites members to closely align themselves with the identity of the community. It may be best to say that members want to be identified with a community and its goals and, therefore, integrate the community into their own identity. This is exemplified by individuals who consider community in the sense of an extended family, such as support groups for individuals with a common illness or disease. The members of the support group identify with one another through the common goal of enduring and/or surviving their affliction. This is also an inverse relationship. By this I mean that the community is composed of something contributed by each member.

True community requires a kinship between members as a way to agree upon, or recognize, membership. Each individual must accept other individuals as concomitant members of the community (Kegley 43). This sixth subcondition is "kinship." Loosely, this is an issue of membership. In other words, for a community to exist, membership must be an agreement between those who voluntarily wish to participate as members of the community and those who are already voluntary participants in the community. A community accepts members only on its own terms. Membership cannot be imposed or

conferred from outside the community, and others cannot assume membership in a community against the concurrence of the community. Community members agree to recognize one another as having membership in their community. We can illustrate this using an example of feminists. Consider an individual who has views and supports social changes that are often interpreted by others as “feminist.” These interpretations may or may not be accurate and, the individual may indeed be a feminist. However, no one can force the individual to accept membership in a community of feminists. Conversely, if there is a group of people who consider one another to be a community of feminists, it will be up to them to decide if a new individual receives membership. Groups of people who are a community retain the sole ability to confer membership upon those who wish to join. No outside individual, in this case someone outside the community who interprets an individual as a feminist, however accurate, can confer membership, despite the possibility that others outside the group might stereotype an individual as feminist and as a member of a feminist community.

In addition to Royce’s six subconditions, I will add two of my own and provide labels and explanations for each; these are “care” and “equality.” I include these to expand on qualities that I believe Royce’s subconditions already implicitly include. I will make them explicit. They are important enough to require their own explanations.

Royce’s original subconditions imply a concept I will call “care.” Here, I use “care” as it is described by Nel Noddings in “An Ethic of Caring.” When we

care, we are responding to “the initial impulses with an act of commitment,” that is to say, “I commit myself to overt action on behalf of the cared-for [...] or I commit myself to thinking about what I might do” (39). Upon recognizing the needs of another human being, we may feel one of the following ways, “I must do something” or “something must be done” (39). In the context of “I must do something,” we have committed ourselves to care. Conversely, in the context of “something must be done,” we remove ourselves from any obligation to act (39). To be more precise, community is a context in which members care for one another, and must do something on each other’s behalf when needed. When we consider the previous conditions and subconditions given by Royce, it is important to explore the care and concern that members of a community have for one another and for the community. We can infer from the other subconditions that this condition must exist in community. If members did not care in some meaningful way, there would be no support from the community for members who are in need. For example, we can once again consider the basketball team community. Suppose one of the team members begins exhibiting signs of an eating disorder, which other team members recognize as interfering with her/his health. Seeing that their team member is in need of support, other community members will find a way to help he/she seek counseling or medical attention in order to meet the need. For further evidence of what I call “care,” we can return to the explanation given earlier by Kegley regarding 1) respect, 2) the will to interpret, and 3) reciprocity and mutuality (41-42). It seems that these cannot be met unless

members care for one another. True community requires the care of its members for one another.

Royce's original subconditions also imply what I will refer to as "equality." To be more precise, community is a context in which all members cooperate as equals for mutual advantage. This kind of equality is not my own idea. In *A Theory of Justice* by John Rawls, he maintains

that the persons in the initial situation would choose two rather different principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society (543).

Here, Rawls is speaking of equality with regard to a principle of fairness in society. He is not speaking explicitly about equality with regard to community. However, in my understanding, community requires the type of equality that Rawls defines in terms of fairness, such that any inequality serves to benefit the least advantaged member of a community. I discuss the subject of inequalities in greater depth in Chapter Three, in particular the kinds of inequalities based on merit. In this thesis, I will use Rawls' principle and apply it as a subcondition of community. Rawls also tell us,

The intuitive idea is that since everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated (543).

Once again, Rawls is not speaking explicitly of equality with regard to community. It is my understanding that this explanation of equality is

consistent with the conditions and subconditions given by Royce. In other words, true community requires a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have experiences as a human being in relationships with other human beings in community. This scheme of cooperation includes the coexistent requirement of Rawls' kind of equality. This is the final subcondition which I refer to as "equality."

It is necessary here to briefly address the idea of space, or environment. As I have already explained, community must be understood in terms of human relationships. One of the assumptions in this thesis is that community requires shared-space, or a shared environment. As I will explain later in this chapter when exploring the idea of anarchic communities, it is one of my general assumptions that community members must be able to interact directly, in other words without a mediating boundary through which they can, at most, only guess at one another's presence.<sup>1</sup>

As I said in the introduction to this section, community can be understood in the context of individuals and their relationships with other individuals, and in the context of relationships between individuals and the communities of which they are members. This definition can also include the

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<sup>1</sup> This does not discount communities such as those on the internet, or "cyber communities." In communities such as these the medium of communication, computers and internet chat rooms, do not constitute mediating boundaries that prevent individuals from realizing one another's presence. The various theories about the size, shape and composition of the environment are not a concern I will continue to address here. However, I recognize that they may have important implications for the application of my definition of community and I will briefly return to this topic again in Chapter 4.

context of relationships that communities have with other communities. Each of the conditions I have given for individuals will also be true of communities. Thus, when communities interact with other communities, each community is as the individual interacting with other individuals. In relationships with members of other communities, each community member must exhibit the conditions of individuality, intersubjectivity, and unity, as well as the eight subconditions, which are voluntariness, cooperation, collaboration, progress, integration, kinship, care and equality. Moreover, just as an individual needs to be in I-Thou relationships with other individuals so as to be complete, it is also the case that communities need to be in I-Thou relationships with other communities, mutually affirming each community's members as subjects, in order for all to be whole beings.

In Chapter Three I will argue that communities within institutions can be part of a larger community, which I call "whole community," and I will explain which kinds of hierarchies allow for creating, and sustaining whole community. I will return to the idea of community later in this chapter, but for now I turn to the following section in which I provide definitions for the different kinds of hierarchies that are important to my thesis.

### **Hierarchy**

There is no universally agreed upon definition of "hierarchy," and dictionaries offer multiple possibilities. There are also different kinds of hierarchies within respective fields of study, and the term "hierarchy" takes on

different meanings as it is applied to different subjects. For instance, in legal terms a hierarchy may be defined with regard to a set of laws or courts and the authority relationships between them. Alternatively, in medical terms a hierarchy may be used to explain the structural relationships between organs, tissues, and cells. In this section, I will explain the different kinds of hierarchies that are important to my thesis. They are: control, taxonomic, arbitrary, and merit-based.

In general, I will use a definition of “hierarchy” from Lani Roberts’ essay, “Difference and Hierarchy.” For the purposes of discussing the relationship between hierarchies and human differences, Roberts defines a hierarchy as “[...] a group of persons or things ranked or graded in an above/below relationship according to orders, classes, capacity, authority. We may say, without prejudice, the ranking can be based on any shared attribute” (3).

Roberts also shares her insight regarding one more important part of this definition, “I also want to make note of the fact that conceptions of superiority and inferiority are strikingly noticeable by their explicit absence in these definitions even though value judgment seems clearly involved” (3). As Roberts has identified, some hierarchies define relationships of vertical location and relative value, but other kinds of hierarchies mark superior and inferior location independent of value. This is an important component of the definition especially when we consider the relationships that hierarchies have with community.

In *Living Things as Hierarchically Organized Structures*, Uko Zylstra explains the presence of seven different types of hierarchies that living biological organisms exhibit. These seven hierarchies are Control, Taxonomic, Command, Constitutive, Aggregational, Inclusive, and Exclusive. My interest is in the first two.

Zylstra explains the primary distinction between control hierarchies and taxonomic hierarchies involving the presence or absence of authority:

Control hierarchies are characterized by some type of authority relation of a higher level upon the elements of a lower level. [...] An example of this dual control is the cell, in which the molecules provide the substratum (initial conditions) for cell activity, and the cell provides the context (boundary conditions) for molecular activity. [...] Taxonomic hierarchies are those formed by grouping entities in some ranking order. Each level is a rank in the ordering of such entities. Whether or not there exists some authority relation between the ranks depends largely on the nature of the organization. In a taxonomic hierarchy of, for example, species, genera, families, orders, etc., an authority relation is absent (114).

In the following sections, I discuss the control and taxonomic hierarchies Zylstra describes at greater length, then I describe two kinds of criteria used to decide how control and taxonomic hierarchies organize individuals within institutions. I call the first “Arbitrary Criteria,” and the second I call “Merit-Based Criteria.”

### **Control Hierarchies**

In our society, we can easily identify many examples of both taxonomic and control hierarchies as Zylstra defines them. Control hierarchies exist wherever we organize differing amounts of authority within our society. I will



explore the meaning and implications of the way “authority” can be defined later in this chapter as I examine the concept of “anarchic communities.”

Institutions such as political organizations, businesses, military branches and universities are organized using control hierarchies. For instance, the president or CEO of a company holds authority superordinate to the vice-president, who in turn holds authority superordinate to that held by managers and supervisors of the business’s different departments. Then, within those departments, each employee holds an amount of authority subordinate to their supervisor or manager.

In hierarchies such as these, the levels are formed by the putative amount of authority held by an individual. The authority granted to individuals allows them to set boundaries for those in lower levels. This authority also allows each individual to participate in setting the conditions upon which the levels above them operate, though it is to a limited extent. From control hierarchies we can more or less determine the authority of a given level relative to the authority of other levels. However, control hierarchies do not explicitly reveal how or why an individual, community, or multiple communities, are instantiated at a certain level in a hierarchy. Control hierarchies also do not give us any information as to how or why an entity can be promoted or demoted, elevated or lowered. Thus, we cannot learn from a control hierarchy any information as to why a given community or individual came to be instantiated at any particular level; they are merely informative regarding differences of authority. Throughout most of our

society, control hierarchies are used for social organization. Because they are also the basis of organization for institutions, there are implications for community/communities within institutions. To reveal the kinds of criteria used to determine why one community or individual is superordinate or subordinate to another, we must consider three other kinds of hierarchies.

### **Taxonomic Hierarchies**

Taxonomic hierarchies are present wherever we try to classify entities according to some kind of ranking criteria. Zylstra gives the example of the taxonomic classification system for biological life that uses the levels: kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, species (114). There may be an authority difference between the levels in a taxonomic hierarchy. If there is, however, it is due to the combination of a taxonomic hierarchy with a control hierarchy, previously discussed.

Taxonomic hierarchies are used to organize individuals based strictly on specified criteria, which I will discuss in greater detail later, for the purposes of classification. In other words, taxonomic organization provides information as to how certain levels are related to one another, given the particular criteria to which each level corresponds (114). For example, in our society human beings are classified using taxonomic hierarchies. However, the use of taxonomic hierarchies for organizing people in our society is typically not done using scientific evidence or any significant factual explanation. These taxonomic hierarchies are generally based on stereotypical assumptions, such as the idea

of different races of human beings. Roberts elaborates by saying that “racial hierarchies, for example, seem to be taxonomic hierarchies, albeit false ones, which are also control hierarchies” (7). She points out that this use of what would seem to be a taxonomic hierarchy is false according to all scientific research. There is another related problem when people are so arranged. In our society these false taxonomic hierarchies are also used, in turn, as control hierarchies (Roberts, 7). This means that classifying individuals and communities for the purposes of organizing social authority are all too often based upon an incorrect assumption about different “racial” characteristics.

As discussed above, it is possible that both kinds of hierarchies, control and taxonomic, can be combined in such a way that they modify one another. In our society, taxonomic-control hierarchies can also be based on cultural, rather than racial characteristics. With cultural characteristics the information about a given culture may be correct, as opposed to racial characteristics that are based on arbitrary assumptions. However, the ranking and authority of cultural characteristics in a taxonomic-control hierarchy can determine which ethnic groups are granted authority or rank above or below others. For example, our society places cultural practices of Protestant European-Americans above cultural practices from all other cultures; e.g., the cultural practices of Jewish-Americans. The social and commercial arrangements our society makes for the Christmas holiday are examples of the high rank for a cultural characteristic.

Just as with control hierarchies, taxonomic hierarchies also do not provide us with information regarding how or why each entity, in this thesis each group or community, is assigned a rank or classification in the hierarchy; they only inform us about what ranking and classifications are assigned. They also do not explain what certain benefits, privileges or burdens the varying ranks and classifications may carry. When we look at the use of control and taxonomic hierarchies in our society, we must also consider the way in which individuals and communities are assigned to different levels in a hierarchy. Next, as we look at arbitrary and merit-based criteria, it will be possible to examine the ways in which individuals and communities are assigned a location.

### **Hierarchies Based on Arbitrary Criteria**

Taxonomic and control hierarchies can organize individuals on the basis of arbitrary criteria. This results in Arbitrary-Control and/or Arbitrary-Taxonomic hierarchies, both of which I may refer to generally as “arbitrary-based hierarchies.” In our society, arbitrary-based hierarchies can be found anywhere people are privileged or disadvantaged based on characteristics or criteria over which they have no control. I use the term “privilege” as described by Peggy McIntosh to mean a set of unearned advantages about which the “privileged” individual or community is meant to remain unaware, but can always count on using for their own benefit (94-95). Conversely, I use the term “disadvantage” to mean the set of undeserved consequences

experienced by “disadvantaged” individuals or communities, which are conditions that serve to benefit the privileged. Thus, disadvantages are at the expense of those who are disadvantaged, to the advantage of those who are privileged. Examples of arbitrary criteria used to privilege and disadvantage certain individuals and communities are race, ethnicity, gender, sexual/affectional orientation, age, etc.. When institutional power, such as can be found in some control hierarchies, is combined with the arbitrary criteria I have given as examples, then it is likely that individuals or communities are assigned to levels in order to privilege some group of people to the disadvantage of some other group or groups of people. For instance, when women receive unequal pay in comparison with men who do the same kind of work.

For this thesis, I will define an arbitrary-based hierarchy to be one in which levels are assigned without necessity, reason or principle but, instead, are based upon preference for some individual or group by those who have the authority to maintain a system of preferential organization. With regard to the arbitrary nature of these hierarchies, it is necessary to understand that they are based upon some characteristic or criteria over which the person or group of people being assigned has no control, such as sex or sexual/affectional orientation. In our society individuals within institutions are often organized using arbitrary-control and arbitrary-taxonomic hierarchies. These hierarchies give preference to certain individuals based on criteria that have no

other purpose but to distinguish who is and who is not privileged or disadvantaged.

Conditions of privilege, disadvantage and oppression exist in our society for and against certain individuals. When I use the term oppressed, I mean it in the context of systematic disadvantages such that oppressed individuals are “caught between or among forces and barriers which are so related to each other that they jointly restrain, restrict or prevent [...] motion or mobility. Situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to penalty, censure, or deprivation” (Frye, 48-49). By looking closely at the individuals who have certain privileges and disadvantages, we can determine which types of hierarchies are and are not being used to organize institutions. For instance, most institutions recognize and support marriage and/or civil unions between two people with different sexual/affectional orientations, thus we can say they are afforded this privilege. Yet, most institutions do not recognize marriage or civil unions between two people with the same, or similar, sexual/affectional orientations, thus, we can say they are disadvantaged, and we can consider them oppressed when they seek but are systematically denied status equal to those with institutional privileges. Unlike taxonomic and control hierarchies, we can determine from arbitrary-based hierarchies how and why individuals or the community they form are granted a rank or classification in the hierarchy.

If we agree that organizing our society using arbitrary-based hierarchies is accurate and moral, then we would also have to accept that it is moral to

benefit or harm people just because of characteristics over which they have no control. Furthermore, it is my assumption that moral right and wrong only apply to freely and rationally chosen behavior. Thus, it would be immoral for one race to dominate and oppress another race, or for one person identified with a particular gender to be dominated and oppressed by persons identified with another gender. To accept the domination and oppression of individuals as I have just described would justify the organization of social institutions in ways that perpetuate the inequalities of racism, sexism, heterosexism, ageism, ableism, classism, and religious persecution, etc.

It is important to clarify how arbitrary-based hierarchies contribute to the oppression of certain groups of people. When control and taxonomic hierarchies are also arbitrary-based hierarchies they are used to influence the way that social authority and classification of people are decided. Arbitrary-based hierarchies provide the criteria by which arbitrary-control and arbitrary-taxonomic hierarchies become oppressive. This can be explained by my previous example. People who have the same or similar sexual/affectional orientations are classified in arbitrary-taxonomic hierarchies as being subordinate to individuals who have sexual/affectional orientations different from each other. Institutions that recognize the marriage of the latter, but not the former do so on the basis of arbitrary criteria, particularly sexual/affectional orientation. Thus we observe the result of an arbitrary-control hierarchy; it has been used to organize the institution of marriage so as to privilege some and disadvantage others.

One may ask whether or not it is always the case that arbitrary-based hierarchies are oppressive. As I have defined them, arbitrary-based hierarchies are applied to individuals and/or communities without their consent in ways that necessarily advantage some to the oppressive disadvantage of others. While it is possible that there may be some cases when arbitrary-based hierarchies are not oppressive, I am concerned here specifically with oppressive arbitrary-based hierarchies that are used to organize institutions and as a result interfere with the possibility of community.

### **Hierarchies Based on Merit**

Taxonomic and control hierarchies can also be used to organize individuals on the basis of merit. Thus, we may observe merit-based-control, and/or merit-based-taxonomic hierarchies, which I will refer to in general as “merit-based hierarchies.” I use the term “merit” here to mean that benefits awarded to individuals have been earned on a level playing field where opportunities are equally accessible to all members of society. A merit-based hierarchy is one that assigns levels based on demonstrated ability or achievement, with regard to an aspect of character or behavior deserving approval or disapproval, or to a status that is deserved as a result of effort or



action.<sup>2</sup> Because there are arbitrary-based hierarchies, such as those I have already described, it is the case that our institutions are currently not organized to allow for a genuine meritocracy. Here, I will discuss hierarchies based on merit, which can be used to organize institutions without creating and maintaining oppression, thus creating the potential for a meritocracy within institutions.

In some areas of our society, people and groups of people are organized using merit-based hierarchies. Merit-based hierarchies can be found in our society anywhere people are ranked according to earned achievement and/or demonstrated ability. Examples of merit-based hierarchies include educational systems that grade and promote or demote students based on

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<sup>2</sup> It is necessary here to differentiate a common negative connotation of merit from the way I use it in my thesis. The term "merit" has been associated with the idea of a "meritocracy" in which people deserve what they have because it has been earned. A meritocracy assumes that all people are presented with the same opportunities on a level playing field; opportunity is equally accessible. The criticism of this idea, which I agree with, is that our society is not structured to provide equal access. For instance, even the most naturally talented children who are educated in poor schools will be less prepared than those children with comparable intelligence who are educated in wealthy schools. This does not refute the concept of a meritocracy, but it is the case that we do not live in one. In Chapter IV I will further address the doubt that a genuine meritocracy is possible but, ultimately, resolving such doubt is beyond the scope of my thesis.

performance and achievement in the context of some predetermined criteria. Conversely, merit-based hierarchies are not organized by characteristics or criteria over which individuals and communities have no control, such as gender, sexual orientation, race, age, etc. For this reason, it seems reasonable to say that merit-based hierarchies and arbitrary-based hierarchies are mutually exclusive of one another.

Unlike taxonomic and control hierarchies, but like arbitrary-control and arbitrary-taxonomic hierarchies, merit-based-control and merit-based-taxonomic hierarchies indicate how and why each person is granted a rank or classification in the hierarchy. As I have already acknowledged, it is possible for criteria to be determined and established in a way that offers advantages to some people and not to others. For instance, ethnocentric or classist standards for assessing achievement and performance, which are founded upon arbitrary-control and arbitrary-taxonomic hierarchies, can unfairly influence whether or not some people have a more or less difficult/easy time pursuing their goals. In our society, laws and programs in support of affirmative action in the workplace and educational opportunities programs in institutions of higher education have been established to counterbalance these institutional barriers. Alternatively, merit-based hierarchies provide the earned criteria by which merit-based-control and merit-based-taxonomic hierarchies can equitably distribute differing amounts of authority throughout institutions.

Because hierarchies organize many aspects of our society, they have an influence over both our social and individual treatment of one another. This influence can be seen in interpersonal interactions as well as in institutional policies, structures, leadership, etc. Using hierarchies to organize society based on characteristics over which people have no control creates a society in which some people can become powerful and oppressive and others are disadvantaged and oppressed. In popular media, such as magazines, film and newspapers, there are daily examples of privilege, disadvantage, and oppression. These examples range from blatant warfare and cultural extermination to more subtle images that portray some groups of people as more or less good or bad than other groups of people.

By using hierarchies to organize society based on merit, it is possible to create a society in which all people can equitably earn access to status and authority. In our society, there are few examples of equality of opportunity and equal access. Some of the few examples include educational systems that have undergone modifications to counteract the institutional barriers created by arbitrary-based hierarchies. Other examples include some merit-based athletics and competitive sports.

### **Four Theories of Community**

In this section, I will explore four different theories of community. They are: "Gemeinschaft (und Geselleschaft)" by Ferdinand Tönnies, "Anarchic Communities" by Michael Taylor, "Mestizo Democracy" by John Francis

Burke, and finally, “Communitarianism” by Amitai Etzioni. I will summarize the concepts related to institutions, communities and hierarchies from each theory, and how they relate to my thesis.

### **Gemeinschaft (und Geselleschaft) by Ferdinand Tönnies**

In 1887 German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies published *Gemeinschaft und Geselleschaft*, which translates to “Community and Society.” In this book, he describes Gemeinschaft, or community, in terms of social organization that closely resembles an extended family. Community is the intimate form of social organization, versus the impersonal Geselleschaft, or society. His differentiation between the two is this:

The theory of the Gesellschaft deals with the artificial construction of an aggregate of human beings which superficially resembles the Gemeinschaft in so far as the individuals live and dwell together peacefully. However, in the Gemeinschaft they remain essentially united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in the Gesellschaft they are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors (64-65).

He does not directly address the concept of hierarchy in his theory of community, but he does address the concepts of “Dominance and Balance,” “Authority,” “Inequality,” and “Control and Property.” Here, I explain my understanding of each of these in the context of hierarchy.

Tönnies tell us that dominance inevitably exists as a part of the relationships between individuals in community (41). The will of individuals direct and serve one another mutually, thus anything that gives one or some human wills dominance must be counterbalanced by stronger influences from

opposing human wills. Dominance can only exist temporarily, until it is counterbalanced by other human wills. In this way, dominance in community is resolved as different individuals bring their respective wills into equilibrium. The assumption that underlies this equilibrium is that “all superiority carries with it the danger of haughtiness and cruelty and, therefore, of a hostile, coercive treatment, if accompanying increasing superiority, the tendency to benefit those dominated is not greater or does not also increase” (41). Tönnies continues by saying that the greater one individual’s force or power, the greater ability she/he has to aid others who are relatively subordinate. Tönnies tells us that this results in a “naïve tenderness of the strong for the weak,” which in his view is a positive, compassionate attribute (41). What he does not tell us is what compels someone toward “naïve tenderness,” or what the source of the tendency is to benefit those who are dominated. It is my view of community that the source of such a tendency would be found in what Josiah Royce calls “the moral insight.” He tells us that there is an insight into other individuals that goes beyond sympathy, which is merely an impulse (Royce 9). In my understanding, our relationships to others must be I-Thou in order to move to such an insight. When we consider other community members, the moral insight tells us that

if he is real like thee, then is his life as bright a light, as warm a fire, to him, as thine to thee; his will is full of struggling desires, of hard problems, of fateful decisions; his pains are as hateful, his joys as dear. Take whatever thou knowest of desire and striving, of burning love and of fierce hatred, realize as fully as thou canst what that means, and then with clear certainty add: *Such as that is for me, so is it for him, nothing less* [emphasis in original] (9).

The dangers of hostile and coercive treatment that Tönnies speaks of stem from the inequalities created and maintained by arbitrary-control hierarchies. However, when we choose to interact with other individuals from the moral insight, we are able to realize that each individual has the same kinds of real experiences we do. With an understanding that others are just as real as ourselves, we can see that it is necessary to act so as to relieve one another from hostile and coercive treatment just as we would act to relieve ourselves from it. In my understanding, community cannot be created or sustained if arbitrary-control hierarchies maintain the kind of inequalities that permit, and at times foster, hostile and coercive treatment. As I will argue in Chapter Three, a theory of community must address this issue.

In the context of community, Tönnies defines authority as “a superior power which is exercised to the benefit of the subordinate and which [...] is accepted by him” (41). I understand this kind of authority as a result of Rawls’ principle, which I describe as “equality,” a subcondition for community. In other words, authority is exercised by those who have it inasmuch as it benefits those over whom it is exercised. This kind of authority can be a characteristic of some control hierarchies, but in a community it is only possible for some to have authority over others if those others who are subordinate confer their good will upon the superordinate. In other words, those with authority must act with respect toward their subordinates in order to receive reverence and respect reciprocally. Otherwise, authority is negated when the subordinates

revoke their good will (42). As I understand Tönnies, if authority is taken or allocated by force, then community cannot exist. This agrees with my description of community, but I explain it in the context of arbitrary-control hierarchies. When the bearers of authority are chosen based on arbitrary criteria, we cannot assume that those who have been made subordinate have willingly given up equality for arbitrary reasons. Tönnies goes on to say that authority is equivalent to services and offices in a community. Community authority is exercised by individuals through their service to the community. In their service, or office, each individual retains one or more "rights," which he describes as the will to initiate action, to allow action to be initiated, and finally to accept responsibility (46). Individuals may also have a "duty" to the community that is linked conceptually to their rights. "Duty" refers to a claim the community has on an individual. Tönnies explains the limits of individual freedom in the duality of right and duty. The duty one has to the community is in proportion to their right. An individual may wish to exert his/her rights in some way but may be less likely to do so because of a duty that the community places upon them. For example, a university student body president may wish to exert one of his/her rights by changing a student government committee process to fit her/his own agenda. However, if the student-body community reminds the president that to exert rights in such a way would be inconsistent with his/her duties to the community, then the president would be less likely to carry out her/his will. The community authority, which Tönnies calls "community will," determines the proportions

of rights and duties each individual is dealt. Tönnies acknowledges that if there is not a balance between the rights and duties of individuals, then a community cannot retain integrity (46). When a given individual's authority becomes too great, then his/her rights and duties have become imbalanced. Thus, an individual's connection to her/his community dissolves as he/she exerts authority in ways that are inconsistent with duties to the community. In other words, individual authority can become disconnected from obligations to community.

Finally, there is one more component of Tönnies' theory of community that is important to my thesis. He supports the idea that differences of authority may come from differences of merit. Two different kinds of authority are illustrated by two analogies (185). The first is the idea of a master artist or craftsman and the relationship she/he has to an apprentice. The apprentice realizes she/he is subordinate in skill to the master, and submits to the master in order to learn the trade or craft.

The second, is the idea of a master artist or craftsman and his/her relationship to a journeyman, or employee. The journeyman has learned the trade from the master, and her/his skills are equivalent to those of the master, but he/she continues in service as an employee or assistant. In my understanding, merit-control hierarchies are a kind of hierarchy that would not interfere with community. In both of the previous examples, there are inequalities based on merit that provide different levels of authority,



concordantly, without interfering with community. Thus, community provides for the unity of unequal beings (46).

In my understanding of *Gemeinschaft*/community, the individual decides between wielding authority as a ruthless tyrant or as a noble leader when the opportunity presents itself (Tönnies 41). I believe this is where Royce's idea of the moral insight informs the decisions of those who hold authority in a community. An individual must be able to acknowledge his/her relationships to the community, and must be willing to relate to community members in such a way that personal will is aimed at a desire to aid and to protect, or in other words, to affirm the humanity of others as one would affirm his/her own (Kegley 41; Royce 9; Tönnies 41).

As opposed to community, Tönnies asserts that society is the state of social organization in which people are separated and at odds with one another in spite of all uniting factors. This distinction between community and society is consistent with my thesis. In my view, most of the hierarchies organizing institutions are similar to this description of society; people and groups of people are at odds with one another in spite of all uniting factors. Thus, there are certain kinds of hierarchies used to organize institutions, certain kinds of hierarchies used to organize within communities, and kinds used to organize among communities. Although the theory of *Gemeinschaft*/community and *Gesellschaft*/society acknowledges separation between people, it does not explain what happens when distinct groups of individuals are unequal in institutions, whether through arbitrary or merit-based criteria. This is the

issue I explore further in Chapter Three. For now, I will discuss the concept of “anarchic communities” as described by Michael Taylor.

### **Anarchic Communities - Michael Taylor**

In *Community, Anarchy, and Liberty*, Michael Taylor defines “anarchism” by comparing it to, and contrasting it with, the concept of “states.” He uses the term “states” as it is used by Max Weber to mean “human associations that successfully claim the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (4-5). Furthermore, he says that a state entails two conditions, “a concentration of force and the attempt by those in whose hands it is (incompletely) concentrated to determine who else shall be permitted to employ force and on what occasions” (5). Based upon these conditions, he explains that a “pure anarchy” exists when force is perfectly dispersed throughout human associations; there is no concentration of force at all.

We can understand “states” in the same way that I have described taxonomic and control hierarchies. It is my understanding of Taylor’s definition that “states” would have taxonomic and control hierarchies, and “pure anarchy” may have taxonomic hierarchies, but would have no control hierarchies whatsoever. Taylor argues that no evidence of a pure anarchy can be found in human history and goes on to distinguish between “pure anarchy” and “anarchy.”

He tells us that in pure anarchy, there is no inequality in the concentration of authority, however, in anarchy there may be inequalities in the concentration of authority (6). This may take the form of varying degrees of influence, technical knowledge, skill, or other things that have the effect of influencing collective decisions throughout human associations. The important distinction between anarchy and states is that in anarchy there is no means of enforcing the decisions that are made, such as through the use of threats of violence (6-7).

Anarchy, while lacking the means to enforce rules or policies, does not lack authority. According to Taylor, there are two ways to conceptualize the authority that exists in anarchy. The first way, "legitimate authority," rests on traditions and on a belief in the legality of established rules (23). The community confers the legitimacy of this kind of authority upon individuals. Taylor uses the example of a mediator who is an expert in mediation and to whom community members will turn for wisdom when mediation is needed. The mediator does not have the ability to enforce the outcome of the mediation through the use of force. Only those who are being mediated can enforce the outcome upon themselves; they must hold themselves responsible to their commitments. However, the mediator has authority conferred by the community such that the parties who are being mediated recognize and abide by the legitimacy of the decisions made by the mediator.

The second form of authority can be understood as "an authority," in the sense of "an expert" (23). To continue from the previous example, a doctor

is an expert in medicine in the sense that she/he has knowledge, or expertise, of the subject of medicine that is superior to that of others in the community. For this reason, a doctor is seen as “an authority” on medicine. In anarchy, individuals can be considered to have authority, or to be an authority. At times, authority is the means by which individuals influence collective decisions. In the previous example, the doctor, as an expert, may use his/her wisdom and understanding of medicine when she/he is consenting to, or dissenting from collective decisions of a community. The respect and esteem the rest of the community members have for the doctor’s skill and wisdom provides the basis for her/his influence.

Taylor argues that the concept of “community” is “open-textured.” In other words, “there is not, and there cannot be an exhaustive specification of the conditions for the correct use of the concept, a set of criteria or tests that are both necessary and sufficient for something to be deemed a community” (26). I agree with Taylor’s point that there can be no test to say whether or not something is sufficient to be a community. I offer my definition of community and say that the criteria I provide are shared, to some extent, by any community; the criteria are necessary for community, but not sufficient. Taylor puts forward the same idea when he offers the following three criteria that he asserts are shared, to some extent, by all communities.

The first condition shared by all communities is that the group of individuals who make up a community share common beliefs and values. There will be variations in the range of beliefs and values and the degree to

which they are articulated, elaborated and systematized, depending on the unique community (26). I consider this to be consistent with Royce's criteria, discussed earlier, that I have labeled "integration." In my understanding of community, common beliefs and values are included along with common goals as a part of what individuals integrate into their identities as community members.

For the second condition, Taylor explains that relations between community members are both direct, and many-sided (27). By direct, he means that they are not mediated by representatives, leaders, bureaucrats, or institutions such as can be found in "states" (27-28). This is, in general, consistent with the criteria I provided earlier that community requires a shared environment. When Taylor uses the term "many-sided," he means that individuals must be able to relate to one another through more facets of themselves than only the facets of the shared beliefs and values of a single community (28). Thus, each individual will have selves that are based in the shared values and beliefs of multiple communities with which she/he identifies, and selves that are made up of his/her own unique values and beliefs.

Community members interact with one another based on both of the kinds of selves I have just described. Also, as I explained earlier, community requires individuals who seek more than conformity to social will and, in fact, requires individuals who interact with one another, often in contrast to social will. This is consistent with Royce's condition that I have labeled

“individuality.” Individuals may choose their own goals, be unique and have the ability to search for meaning beyond the community plan. Moreover, for individual community members, communities may overlap. Community members may interact based upon multiple community values, beliefs, etc. The individual may choose to value some communities differently than others. For example, individuals simultaneously relate to religious/spiritual communities, educational communities, neighborhood communities, etc.

The third condition Taylor provides for community is “reciprocity.” This term includes the joint concepts of “short-term altruism” and “long-term self-interest.” “I help you out now in the (possibly vague, uncertain and uncalculating) expectations that you will help me out in the future” (29). I think reciprocity is a combination of Royce’s two concepts that I have labeled “cooperation” and “collaboration.” Community members are aware of one another’s actions, and cooperate with those actions. Also, community members recognize the necessity of collective actions, and collaborate by making various contributions. This combination of mutual awareness and collective contributions would produce relationships in which the kinds of reciprocity Taylor describes would occur in community.

There is one additional concept that Taylor believes is included in, but is not necessarily a condition for, the existence of community. He quotes Martin Buber as saying that man [sic] needs “to feel his own house as a room in some greater, all-embracing structure in which he is at home, to feel that other inhabitants of it with whom he lives and works are all acknowledging

and confirming his individual existence" (32). According to Taylor, what Buber is describing is the need for a sense of belonging and mutual affirmation (32). While Taylor believes this is not a condition found in all communities, I believe that this is a need experienced by individuals and it can only be met in the context of community.

The idea of anarchism and community is captured, finally in Taylor's description of "anarchic intentional communities." These are communities located in larger societies. However, anarchic intentional communities construct an entire way of life alternative to that of the society from which they partially withdraw (37). These communities make decisions and settle community matters internally, without seeking intervention from the society. This point is crucial to understanding the way I define community. As I will argue in Chapter Three, some communities may come to exist within hierarchical institutions solely for the members to withdraw to. In other words, they are havens in which individual community members find refuge from some undesirable, most often harmful, condition in society. Yet, I will also argue that it is possible to have a kind of "whole community" within institutions such that would allow the possibility for many communities to equitably coexist.

### **Mestizo Democracy - John Francis Burke**

Until this point, I have not given very much attention to the types of differences that might be used to arbitrarily separate people or groups of

people, even communities, hierarchically. My focus is mainly on the generalized differences of race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexual/affectional orientation, age, physical ability, etc. I realize that these categories are generalizations from the complex diversity of humanity and do not account for the fact that some are entirely a social construct. Even so, they will help to illustrate my concept of community and hierarchy.

I may use the terms “differences,” “diversity,” and “uniqueness” interchangeably at times. As discussed earlier in Royce’s definition of community, the experiences of the members of a community are shared through interaction. Individual uniqueness does not dissolve in such a way that individual uniqueness is minimized or eradicated. The individual is preserved to the benefit of the entire community. In Chapter Three, I will argue further that in order to create and sustain community in institutions, differences must be valued and affirmed.

In *Mestizo Democracy*, John Francis Burke presents the idea of “unity-in-diversity” by exploring the idea of “mestizo”/”mestizaje.” The term “mestizo,” originating in Latin America, is applied to mean any person of racially or ethnically mixed origins. Employing imagery of crossing borders, “mestizaje” is used to describe how differences operate in community, it is the foundation of the idea that a just democracy must move beyond possessive, tight scripting of cultural identities in order to engage and foster the intersection of multiple cultural groups in an inclusive and democratic fashion (15).



Burke asks: “how can marginalized groups gain genuine access – without emasculating [sic] their respective cultures in the process – to the political, social, and economic decision-making structures that in large part affect their destinies?” (16). His answer is that a just democracy is a political system “that considers how cultures can realize their respective distinctness in interaction with other cultures while simultaneously engendering a just, substantive political community in which the dignity of ‘others’ is not marginalized” (16). He continues by saying that a substantive sense of community can emerge through a democratic integration of diverse cultures. This concept of a unity-in-diversity is one in which 1) a democratic community is constituted and reinvigorated through – not in spite of – the intersections of diverse cultures, and 2) the distinctiveness of each culture is accented through – not apart from – this nexus of cultures (35).

The challenge, Burke explains, is to reject hierarchical relationships that prevent the realization of collaborative forms of decision-making (105). Mestizo democracy proposes an alternative to hierarchy, one in which people are genuinely equal partners in dialogue (107). According to Burke, a society that adopts the concept of unity-in-diversity can transform political, economic, and social relationships of dominance and subjugation/exclusion into relationships of empowerment (108). Such a society, in other words, a mestizo democracy, is one in which diverse cultures and groups can relate to one another in ways that do not result in the supremacy of one way of being over others (112).

### **Communitarianism - Amitai Etzioni**

Around 1971, communitarianism began to develop as a political movement concerned with the connections between society, institutions and community. In *The Spirit of Community*, Amitai Etzioni explores the ways in which community has been lost in contemporary U.S. society, and how a communitarian movement would restore community through a social philosophy that balances individual autonomy and social cohesion. This is done from a unique perspective that incorporates several claims regarding human obligations to one another, or what can be considered the morality of community.

He explains that, in society, communities congeal around institutions such as schools and churches (135). Within institutions, communities also stand between the individual and society in order to provide the social base, or conscience, of the mediating institutions. I believe the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre best describes what Etzioni means by "conscience." In "After Virtue," MacIntyre gives a warning about the encroachment of institutions upon individuals. He tells us that the creativity and ideology of the practice of creating and sustaining community are always vulnerable to the competitive acquisitiveness of a given institution (Cahn & Markie, 670-671). Without an overarching sense of community among those within institutions, institutional processes tend to instantiate individuals as means to an end. For example, the more profitable certain businesses become, the more likely chief executive

officers may be to view some employees as mindless laborers rather than human beings. However, when institutions are made up of communities, the communities protect individuals from excessive encroachment by those with authority.

It is my view that when institutions become oppressive toward individuals, it is to communities that the oppressed turn for support. Thus, to protect individuals from encroachment by institutions, we should consider how institutions are organized. In Chapter Three I will discuss this in depth, and explain how institutions should be organized so that individuals have their needs met by institutions, and also enjoy the kind of protection Etzioni describes.

With regard to community, Etzioni tells us that the method of communitarianism is to provide empowerment for individuals to engage openly in the decision-making processes that govern their lives (142). The goal of this empowerment is to provide opportunities for deep human satisfaction, the kind found only when we are engaged with one another, and to develop a moral infrastructure through strengthened community (142).

Communitarian social justice entails two types of responsibilities. First, people have a moral responsibility to help themselves as best they can. Second, moral responsibility falls to those closest to the individual in need – family, friends, neighbors, etc. (144). Furthermore, he offers as a general rule the idea that every community ought to be expected to do the best it can to take care of its own (144). These two ideas foster relationships of mutuality

and reciprocity. In Etzioni's view, people help one another and sustain the spirit of community because they sense it is the right thing to do, yet he, like Tönnies, does not explain how individuals come to a sense of moral responsibility towards those closest to them (144). It is my view that individuals who are in I-Thou relationships with one another must develop a moral insight, thereby sustaining moral responsibilities to one another such as those Etzioni describes.

In the communitarian perspective, communities overlap such that "society is a community of communities" (146). In fact, Etzioni uses the term "supracommunity" to mean that various communities are connected to one another. This is similar to the concept that, in Chapter Three, I will describe as "whole community." By this, I mean that various communities may exist in an institution, and that they overlap and connect to form a larger, whole community. Also, as I will argue, this is possible without losing the unique value of any of the individual community members who collectively form the whole community.

When the communitarian idea of supracommunity is combined with the concepts of mutuality and reciprocity discussed above, the Communitarian realizes that societies must help those communities whose ability to help their members is severely limited (146). For example, societies must be willing to help impoverished communities to resolve the conditions of poverty experienced by community members. For the Communitarian then, social justice is both an inter-community and an intra-community issue. "We start

with our responsibility to ourselves and to members of our community; we expand the reach of our moral claims and duties from there” (147).

Communitarianism is also consistent with mestizo democracy in that community does not marginalize cultural differences. Likewise, whole community must be inclusive of many diverse communities, each of which retains its uniqueness. The goal of this thesis is to show how that can occur in institutions that are organized hierarchically.

### **Summary**

In this chapter, I have provided explanations for the main concepts “institution,” “community,” and “hierarchy” as well as for the different kinds of hierarchies important to my thesis. There are two main categories of hierarchies, which are Control and Taxonomic, followed by two subcategories of each, which are Arbitrary and Merit-based hierarchies. The categories and subcategories give us Arbitrary-Control, Arbitrary-Taxonomic, Merit-based-Control and Merit-Based Taxonomic hierarchies.

From the writings of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., we see that community is something we need in order to be whole persons (Washington 20). At the center of community we find I-Thou relationships as described by Martin Buber. The idea of “community” I am using is based on Josiah Royce’s idea of unique “selves,” and includes three conditions from Royce, which I call individuality, intersubjectivity and unity, as well as Royce’s six subconditions,

which I call voluntariness, cooperation, collaboration, progress, integration and kinship (40-43). Finally, I add two of my own sub-conditions. One, which I call “equality,” is based on Rawls’ principle of fairness in a just society (543). The other is the kind of “care” that Nel Noddings tells us motivates us to respond to the needs of others (39).

Ferdinand Tönnies gives us the distinction between community and society (64-65). He introduces us to the idea of “authority” that is conferred to individuals by a community, and tells us that community members can have differences of authority and the conditions in which such authority can be exerted (41-42, 46). Tönnies claims that individuals in community will tend to act with a “naïve tenderness of the strong for the weak,” but goes no further in explaining what the source of that tendency is (41). I say it is found when individuals who are in I-Thou relationships understand one another in terms of Royce’s moral insight. Furthermore, Tönnies does not address what happens when individuals have unequal authority in an institution, which I address in Chapter Three.

In anarchic community, according to Michael Taylor, there are two different kinds of authority (22-25). One kind of authority, like that described by Tönnies, can be conferred by the community when an individual has advanced or superior wisdom in a particular situation. This kind of authority, he calls “legitimate authority,” is exerted by community members so as to make decisions on behalf of other community members. The other kind of authority is like that of “an expert,” or “an authority” in a particular matter.

So, there may be differences of authority between community members, but the unique point is that there is no means of enforcing such authority through the use of violence or threats of force (25). Though we can imagine a society with many anarchic communities as Taylor describes them, he gives us few clues as to how communities interact with other communities in institutions. In Chapter Three, I will draw from the two kinds of authority Taylor describes in order to explain what I call “conferred authority” and “authority of expertise.”

Mestizo democracy introduces us to the importance of diversity in community. John Francis Burke explains that, for community, diversity must be preserved and integrated; community affirms diversity (35). Furthermore, this can be done in such a way that 1) uniqueness is preserved, and 2) groups can interact without any supremacy for one way of being over others (35, 112). As I explained earlier, I will discuss diversity inclusive of, but not limited to, race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexual/affectional orientation, age, ability etc. In Chapter Three my thesis will go a step beyond Burke’s ideas to show that diverse individuals can relate to one another in institutions with preserved and integrated uniqueness, and without oppressive supremacy.

Finally, Amitai Etzioni makes the communitarian argument that community will empower individuals to engage in the processes that govern their lives (142). Once we realize our moral responsibility to one another in community, we realize that social justice is both an inter-community and an intra-community issue (147). When Etzioni concludes that “society is a

community of communities,” it comes very close to capturing my thinking about a “whole community.” My agreement with Tönnies that society is different from community means that society is not a community of communities. Yet, there is a community of communities, and I turn now to Chapter Three to argue that it is to be found in what I call “whole community.”



## **Chapter 3 – Whole Community**

### **Introduction**

In Chapter Two, I described two categories of hierarchies, which are Control and Taxonomic, as well as Arbitrary-Based and Merit-Based criteria, which can be used to organize individuals hierarchically. The categories and criteria allow us to consider four different kinds of hierarchies, they are: Arbitrary-Based-Control, Arbitrary-Based-Taxonomic, Merit-Based-Control and Merit-Based-Taxonomic. Throughout Chapter Three, when I discuss arbitrary-based inequalities, I am referring to inequalities resulting from Arbitrary-Based-Control and Arbitrary-Based-Taxonomic hierarchies, in general. Conversely, when I speak of merit-based inequalities I am referring to inequalities occurring as a result of Merit-Based Control and Merit-Based-Taxonomic hierarchies, in general.

The theories discussed in Chapter Two cover two different, but related ideas. Some tell us what community looks like among individuals, but do not tell us about community in relation to institutions. Others tell us about institutional structures, but do not describe the implications for different communities that occupy those structures. In this chapter, I will develop a synthesis that draws from each of these perspectives. First, I describe the kinds of communities that exist within institutions, and the problems that arbitrary-based inequalities pose for such communities. Then, I provide descriptions of two imaginary universities. The first, Cloister University, will help clarify my view of the tension that currently exists between community

and institutions. The second, Mores University, serves as a model for how the use of merit-based hierarchies makes possible what I call “whole community” in institutions. By “whole community,” I mean that various communities may exist in an institution, and that they overlap and connect to form an institution-wide, whole community. Thus, an individual can be a member of multiple different communities, while simultaneously a member of the larger community. I will discuss the importance of community members having an awareness of both arbitrary-based inequalities and institutional structures and, the necessity for institutions to conduct critical and ongoing assessment of the experiences of individuals and communities. Finally, I will explain how whole community is both a means and an end to preventing arbitrary-based inequalities.

### **Communities Within Institutions**

A tension exists between community and institutions. The source of this tension is located in how individuals are granted or denied access to different levels of authority within institutions based on arbitrary criteria or, more precisely, how we use arbitrary criteria such as race, sex, gender, et al to hierarchically classify individuals and/or assign authority. I will discuss the problems and solutions at two different levels – at the level of individuals and at the level of communities. There are three conditions for community that apply to individuals: intersubjectivity, individuality, and unity, and the eight subconditions of voluntariness, cooperation, collaboration, progress,

integration, kinship, care and equality. Furthermore, a given community is made up of individuals who are in I-Thou relationships with one another. Institutions are the means by which communities tend to their needs. Thus, it is important for community members to have access to the authority that guides institutions so that the needs of individuals and communities are met. Yet, the ways in which we use hierarchies to both classify and to assign authority will in large part determine a given individual or community's ability to affect how an institution operates. If institutional hierarchies are arbitrary, many individuals will not be able to see that their needs are met.

For any given hierarchy, there are criteria that determine what the hierarchy looks like and how individuals and communities are assigned to particular levels. It is how we determine and assign hierarchical criteria within institutions that concerns me. The problem is that individuals in many institutions are organized using hierarchies based on arbitrary criteria, such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, age, ability, socio-economic class, etc. Arbitrary criteria are used to assign individuals to different levels of hierarchies for no other purpose than to maintain oppression. We live in a society where racism, sexism and heterosexism are so prevalent that their effects are often hidden until we raise our own awareness. Whether arbitrary organization is done consciously or not, in the process people are distinguished according to who is and who is not privileged, advantaged, disadvantaged, and oppressed. This kind of organization interferes with our ability to create and sustain a whole community of individuals throughout a

given institution. These unjust inequalities result in hostile and coercive treatment of certain individuals based upon criteria or characteristics over which the oppressed have no control. If this were not the case, they would not be oppressed. Arbitrary-based inequalities are not consistent with community as I have defined it because they prevent us from creating and sustaining a whole community of individuals and communities within institutions and otherwise.

The tension that exists between community and institutions organized by arbitrary-based hierarchies tends to be hidden or accepted as “normal” unless we challenge the prevalent structures. As I will show later, for all individuals and communities within an institution to create and sustain what I call a “whole community,” it is necessary to have a way of organizing based on criteria that relieves the tension between institutions and community. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. tells us, “We [...] bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open where it can be seen and dealt with” (295). It is my goal to reveal such tension between community and institutions, and to show that it can be dealt with because we have the ability to remove or ameliorate arbitrary-based inequalities. Before I go on to explain how I believe institutions must be organized, it is important to look at some of the kinds of communities that can exist within institutions, generally.

### **Communities Comprised of Oppressed Individuals**

Josiah Royce's subcondition I refer to as "kinship" will help to reveal some of the kinds of communities that can exist in institutions. An arbitrary grouping of individuals cannot be considered community unless the individuals voluntarily agree to be members of a community. The idea of kinship assumes that if a community does exist, it existed prior to the use of arbitrary criteria for the purposes of grouping individuals. In other words, arbitrary grouping alone cannot confer membership in a community as only community members can do. For example, a group of university students of Latino descent who did not know one another prior to enrolling are likely to be grouped together arbitrarily, and are likely to share this common experience. This does not necessarily mean that they will all choose to create a community. However, they will probably find that creating and sustaining a community, or joining a community that is already established, has significant benefits. One possible benefit would be the ability to interact with other people of Latino descent in I-Thou relationships. Another of Royce's subconditions supports this claim, which is the concept of voluntariness; membership in a community must be voluntary. Since the existence of arbitrary-based inequalities results in hostile and coercive treatment, individuals who are grouped either intentionally, or as a result of arbitrary-based hierarchies would be comprised of people who are so grouped without their creative involvement. Even if Latino students at a university do form a community, we cannot assume that every Latino student will accept membership. Community cannot be created

or sustained solely as a result of using arbitrary-based hierarchies to maintain the kind of inequalities that permit and, at times, foster hostile and coercive treatment. However, a grouping of individuals who are organized on the basis of arbitrary criteria imposed by the institution can become a community, especially if they do so in order to respond to their shared oppressive conditions by providing one another with mutual support.

Next, consider the subcondition for community from Nel Noddings that I refer to as “care.” Care is the realization that “I must do something” on behalf of those in need; I must act so as to relieve human suffering. When institutions are organized using arbitrary criteria, individuals who are oppressed suffer hostile and coercive treatment. These individuals, who occupy many different levels of the institutional structure, may share the same, or similar, experiences of inequality. If they are not at the top of arbitrary-based hierarchies, then no matter what level they occupy, they are subordinate to those who hold the authority. Oppressed individuals will seek one another for care that responds to their needs. In other words, they seek both to care, and to be cared-for in I-Thou relationships. The remaining conditions and subconditions for community could then arise if the individuals find that creating and sustaining a community will be mutually beneficial to them.

Communities of oppressed individuals, who relate to one another as I describe above, seem to engage one another in what Michael Taylor refers to as a sense of belonging and mutual affirmation such that when individuals encounter hostile and coercive treatment, it is to the community that they turn

for support (32). For example, we can think of people within a university who identify as Asian/Pacific American, or APA for short, who are students and faculty. Even though APA students in the university are likely to have less institutional authority than APA faculty, neither students nor faculty are free from arbitrary-based inequalities based on criteria of race and ethnicity. Both APA students and faculty will share in the same, or similar experiences of oppression.

Individuals, and the communities of which they are a part, who are oppressed because of arbitrary-based hierarchies, who have felt similarly the results of being oppressed, are drawn to one another for support knowing that they share the same oppressive experiences. It is likely that they will turn to one another to both care-for and be cared-for in the context of I-Thou relationships. From that point, the conditions and subconditions of community can form. In other words, they know the consequences of hostile and coercive treatment, and can choose to form a community.

### **Communities Comprised of Privileged Individuals**

We should also consider communities comprised of individuals who are privileged as a result of arbitrary-based hierarchies, but who form a community for reasons other than sustaining their privileges. For instance, a group of university students who form a community around shared Protestant religious beliefs and traditions could be privileged on the basis of those beliefs and religious traditions. However, they may be unaware that their shared

religious beliefs and traditions afford them privileges that disadvantage others, but still relate to one another in the context of a community. Thus, communities comprised of privileged individuals can exist within institutions. Later in this chapter I discuss the importance for privileged members of any community to have an awareness of arbitrary-based inequalities so that they may begin to challenge the systems that advantage them and oppress others.

### **Communities Comprised of Oppressed and Privileged Individuals**

We can also imagine communities forming in spite of arbitrary-based hierarchies and comprised of individuals who have reasons to join one another besides relief from oppression. For instance, a group of university faculty could conceivably relate to one another in I-Thou relationships and gather around a particular field of study. In spite of arbitrary-based hierarchies, a department faculty which is African-American, European-American, women and men, wealthy and poor may find it possible to create and sustain a community. For instance, the community could arise as faculty work together to develop courses, host guest speakers, edit a professional journal, etc. However, if it is a community, we should expect that, because these individuals relate to one another as I-Thou, members of such a community would be far more likely than those outside of the community to provide one another with refuge from whatever oppression, if any, they suffer.

It is now possible to see that a variety of communities can exist within institutions. Some may be formed as refuge from oppressive inequalities,



while others may be formed for some shared purpose otherwise unrelated to the relief of oppression. We can now consider whether it is possible for various communities to coexist with one another in a larger community of communities, what I call a whole community. Next, I will describe two imaginary institutions of higher education. One, Cloister University, is organized in the same way that most institutions are currently organized in our society, and the other, Mores University, is organized such that the individuals and communities within are a whole community.

### **Cloister University**

At Cloister University (CU), 16,000 undergraduate students and 2000 graduate students occupy a 400-acre campus with numerous areas for relaxing and studying. CU offers 10 residence halls, six cooperative houses, and more than 30 sororities and fraternities, providing a full range of living and social options. Students enjoy Cap-10 Conference athletics, plus numerous intramural, recreational, and club sports. CU is located in the middle of the Pacific Northwest's finest recreational and scenic areas, and has programs in Engineering, Environmental Sciences, Forestry, Pharmacy, and a variety of other areas are nationally recognized for superb quality. Undergraduates participate in the core curriculum, which emphasizes creative thinking, writing, world cultures, the arts, sciences, diversity, literature, and global awareness. An innovative international studies program allows undergraduate students to add an international component to any major program. With

graduate programs in more than 70 areas, CU offers exceptional opportunities for study and research. The average high school GPA of incoming CU first-year students in any given year is 3.46. More than 1,200 international students study at CU every year, adding diversity and richness to the university's academic and cultural life. Internships and undergraduate research opportunities offer CU students the opportunity to gain actual career-related experience while in school. More undergraduate classes are taught by top professors with national reputations for research and teaching than at most major universities. CU's 1,700 graduate faculty members are chosen on the basis of training, experience, research, and evidence of their ability to successfully direct and mentor graduate students. Faculty members throughout the university work closely with students on research, creative projects, university governance, and clubs and organizations.

As with most universities of its size, CU operates on the presupposition that it is a merit-based institution. So, on the surface, academic advancement for students, as well as promotion for faculty and staff are based on merit. Yet, this is only true to an extent. In actuality, the university is organized by arbitrary-based inequalities that have, by default from the larger society, become part of the institutional structure. Arbitrary-based hierarchies are superimposed over the merit-based processes such that individuals at CU are separated by arbitrary-based inequalities. By this, I mean that access to the processes by which the university is governed, has, historically, been influenced by privileges and disadvantages that are afforded or denied to

individuals based on arbitrary, and often scientifically inaccurate, criteria such as race, ethnicity, socio-economic status, gender, sexual/affectional orientation, age, ability, etc. For example, consider the inequalities between African-American students and European-American students. Historically, the ancestors of most African-American students have been subjected to inequalities based upon race and ethnicity. Abducted from their homes by brutal force, and brought to the United States as slaves, students' ancestors endured over three hundred years of oppression at the hands of European-American students' ancestors who benefited from slave labor. European-American slave owners then passed on the economic benefits of such labor to their heirs, particularly their male heirs, for generations. Thus, many male European-American students have inherited economic advantages that were won by hostile and coercive means. As a direct result, African-American students have inherited economic disadvantages which remain unmediated to this day. Since the arbitrary-based inequalities experienced by students from African-American backgrounds do not benefit such students, this interferes with the subcondition of community that I call "equality."

Despite the fact that Cloister University is arranged such that individuals within the institution are supposed to have equitable access, the kinds of inequalities I described above that interfere with equality still exist and influence whether or not students can participate in merit-based processes equitably. Standardized tests are one example. Students at CU who speak English as a second language rarely have the opportunity to take exams in

their primary language, and questions on standardized exams are culturally biased such that they assume all individuals have general knowledge in the context of Euro-American culture in the United States. Euro-American students educated in the United States and who speak English as their primary language are afforded advantages such that when they take standardized exams in almost any given subject, they do not have to overcome these kinds of barriers. Barriers such as these, the result of arbitrary-based hierarchies, may be unintentionally perpetuated, but the effects are significant for community.

Because arbitrary-based inequalities separate individuals at Cloister, a whole community of all individuals within the institution cannot truly be created or sustained. As I discuss later, some of the conditions for community, such as intersubjectivity and unity, as well as some of the subconditions, such as cooperation and collaboration, are not present when institutions are organized arbitrarily. Until the arbitrary-based hierarchies are replaced, Cloister University cannot be a whole community. In other words, arbitrary-based hierarchies create and sustain inequalities between individuals of the kind that interfere with our ability to create and sustain a whole community throughout the institution.

Individuals at Cloister are separated on the basis of arbitrary criteria and the communities of which those individuals are members will also experience the same kinds of separation. This does not mean that some communities at CU cannot come together to form a larger community, and in fact various communities overlap. Take for example members of a community

of faculty women of color and members of a community of faculty women of European-American descent. Many members of these communities are also members of a community called a Faculty Women's Network. Communities overlap, but arbitrary-based inequalities prevent the unity of all individuals and all communities at the university in the context of a whole community. Thus, what we still see are separate communities at odds with one another, in spite of all uniting factors, to the advantage of some and the oppressive disadvantage of others.

Following from the previous example, European-American students and students from underrepresented cultures will most often receive advising from academic advisors who are also of European-American descent. While students technically have equal access to advisors, most academic advisors at CU do not exert effort in creating a welcoming service for all students. European-American students encounter familiar communication styles and cultural contexts for interaction, resulting in a genuine hospitality. Students from underrepresented cultures, on the other hand, are treated with less encouragement and hospitality, and are consistently reminded of their relatively uncommon differences when they interact with advisors. Similar experiences occur in interactions with the CU Office of the Registrar, Financial Aid Office, Residential Life, many professors, etc. The overall negative, campus-wide, effect of these kinds of experiences is detrimental to students from underrepresented cultures. Conversely, the overall impact on European-American students is positive. Circumstance such as these show that the

conditions of intersubjectivity and unity are not present at Cloister. I say that intersubjectivity is not present because the advisors and students do not engage in what Royce described as an attentive engagement with one another (40). In other words, individuals do not interact so as to transcend their own isolated meanings, such as cultural contexts for communication, in order to come to a new, shared, understanding of one another.

Despite the arbitrary-based inequalities that exist at CU, the university observes affirmative action policies and mission and value statements that espouse equality of opportunity and diversity. However, the reality is that administrators at Cloister do little or nothing to make the statements or policies a reality. Dr. King says, "If we are seeking a home, there is not much value in discussing blueprints if we have no money and are barred from acquiring land" (Washington 598). Likewise, if individuals at CU are seeking to create a "home" in the context of whole community, they may want to consider how much value there is in discussing the blueprints laid out in a university mission statement, particularly when only a few individuals have the authority to effect changes that will replace arbitrary-based inequalities. Privileged individuals rarely seek to determine whether or not institutional processes are biased to afford them greater advantages, necessarily at the expense of others. Privileged students, faculty, staff and administrators at Cloister rarely investigate – despite regular complaints and requests for change from individuals in oppressed communities- whether or not merit-based systems are in fact merit-based.

Arbitrary-based inequalities, such as those based on sex and gender, are mistakenly assumed to be merit-based inequalities. One result is that male individuals at Cloister tend to view female individuals with less esteem. In other words, most males, who are arbitrarily privileged, believe that most females, who are arbitrarily disadvantaged, are less capable of earning equivalent achievements. Most females do not have privileged statuses, and, therefore, have not achieved statuses similar to male peers. Because privileged status and achievement are conflated, most males are consistently assumed to have secured achievements based solely on merit. When false assumptions of merit and lack of awareness about arbitrary-based inequalities overlay genuine merit-based processes, the separation of individuals and communities on the basis of arbitrary criteria prevents the institution from affirming the diversity and uniqueness of individuals. This is because diversity is seen, incorrectly, as diluting the quality of merit. This prevents the conditions for community, which I call "cooperation." When the contributions of certain individuals, such as female faculty are seen as lowering the standards of merit, it is easy to imagine how male faculty, who do not question their privileges, treat both female peers and students as unwelcome, low-quality intruders in academia. Most men are unwilling to, as Royce says, "encourage and enjoy" the presence and participation of their peers who are women, seen as low-quality intruders. Furthermore, because men and women generally do not mutually appreciate one another's academic contributions, truly collective work between female

and male students is generally not observed. Thus, the condition of “collaboration” is not present.

Individuals at CU who are separated based on arbitrary criteria, such as socio-economic background, rely on the care they experience as members of a community which is a refuge from oppressive treatment. Individuals at Cloister seek out communities in order to experience intersubjectivity in the context of I-Thou relationships and care that responds to their needs. This is what Michael Taylor referred to as a sense of belonging and mutual affirmation such that when individuals encounter hostile and coercive treatment, it is to the community that they turn for support (32). Even though this avenue is open for individuals, it does not seem that the same can be said for oppressed communities who seek care among all of the communities at Cloister University. There are individuals within the institution, some of whom are in control of the institution, who are privileged solely because other individuals and communities are disadvantaged. Thus, some of the conditions and subconditions which are necessary for community to exist, are not present for all individuals when arbitrary-based hierarchies are, by default or intention, superimposed on the university’s merit-based processes. As long as these inequalities exist and there are individuals who are privileged by virtue of I-It relationships with those who are disadvantaged, then the institution cannot be considered a whole community. Communities comprised of oppressed individuals at CU cannot expect to find a whole community made of I-Thou relationships throughout the institution.



In order for a whole community to exist within an institution such as Cloister, we need a way of organizing individuals and communities that affirms and sustains community. The arbitrary-based hierarchies must be replaced. If it is the case that we want to eliminate oppressive conditions, then it seems we must deal with the systems of organization within institutions, and remove the barriers that prevent people from engaging in the processes that govern these structures. Once engaged, individuals can share in the institutional responsibilities of distributing resources. I believe this is possible, and furthermore I believe that it can be done hierarchically, if and when deemed necessary or desirable by the individuals within the institution. Organizing institutions such as colleges and universities with merit-based hierarchies will not interfere with our ability to create and sustain community, but will in fact make it possible to have a whole community. If we organize institutions using merit-based hierarchies, and work to ameliorate arbitrary ones, then individuals and communities within an institution can become what I call a "whole community" even if the larger society is racist, sexist, heterosexist, etc.

Next, I discuss how Mores University exemplifies the kind of institution in which whole community is possible. After a brief description of the university, I will discuss the key factors that make a community of communities possible within Mores. Each of these factors, if developed within institutions such as Cloister University, would ameliorate the kinds of arbitrary-based inequalities that prevent us from creating and sustaining a whole community.

## **Mores University**

Much like Cloister University, at Mores University (MU) 15,000 undergraduate students and 2300 graduate students enjoy a 450-acre campus with numerous areas for relaxing and studying. MU offers 12 residence halls, eight cooperative houses, providing a full range of living and social options. Students enjoy Cap-10 Conference athletics, plus numerous intramural, recreational, and club sports. Mores is located near many of the Pacific Northwest's finest recreational and scenic areas, and has programs in Engineering, Agricultural Sciences, Forestry, Liberal Arts, and a variety of other areas are nationally recognized for superb quality. MU undergraduates participate in the core curriculum, which emphasizes creative thinking, writing, world cultures, the arts, sciences, diversity, social justice, literature, and global awareness. A comprehensive international studies program invites undergraduate students to add an international component to any major degree. With graduate programs in more than 90 areas, MU offers exceptional opportunities for study and research. The average high school GPA of incoming MU first-year students in any given year is 3.44. More than 2,200 international students study at MU every year, adding diversity and richness to the university's academic and cultural life. Internships, practicum, service-learning and undergraduate research opportunities offer MU students the opportunity to gain actual career-related experience while in school. Most undergraduate classes are taught by top professors with national reputations

for research and teaching than at most major universities. MU's 1,900 graduate faculty members are chosen on the basis of training, experience, research, and evidence of their ability to successfully direct and mentor graduate students. Faculty members throughout the university work closely with students on research, creative projects, university governance, and clubs and organizations.

To sustain a whole community of individuals throughout the institution, Mores has been organized in ways that preserve and promote I-Thou relationships, as well as the conditions and subconditions for community. More precisely, whole community exists at MU because merit-based criteria are used to organize diverse individuals within the institution such that the arbitrary-based inequalities individuals experience elsewhere in society have been ameliorated. To explain whole community at Mores in depth, first I will discuss how MU responds to the needs of arbitrarily disadvantaged individuals. Second, I explain the necessity of using merit-based criteria to justify inequalities in whole community, followed by the kinds of authority that students, staff, faculty and administrators have in the whole community, as well as the assignment of such authority.

### **Ameliorating Arbitrary Disadvantages**

In order to ameliorate the kinds of inequalities perpetuated in society by racism, sexism, heterosexism, etc., Mores University works to replace arbitrary disadvantages with equitable access. This can be thought of as

“leveling the playing field” such that every individual can pursue his/her own dreams and goals from the same “starting line” as everyone else. Like individuals at Cloister, all individuals who come to Mores are from very different backgrounds. For instance, there are cultural and socio-economic differences that influence the advantages and disadvantages each individual will experience throughout most of society. The policies and procedures by which Mores operates are designed to respond to some of the unique needs of individuals who face arbitrary disadvantages outside of this particular institution. For instance, when a Native American student applies to Mores, admissions and financial aid processes are capable of compensating for different factors that would normally place the student at a disadvantage in comparison with privileged European-American students. The financial aid packages are allocated in proportion to needs in ways that equitably ameliorate socio-economic disadvantages. Another example is that raw SAT and GPA scores are not sufficient to determine eligibility for admission to MU, and the university cannot assume that every student has the economic means to afford tuition, fees and other expenses. The admissions and financial aid processes account for circumstances such as whether or not there was sufficient funding at the K-12 school that the Native student attended, student and parent incomes, and the average income level of the neighborhood in which the student grew up.

Mores also makes a dedicated effort to alleviate other disparities, such as disadvantages based arbitrarily on cultural differences. There are many

different cultures represented at Mores, but, like Cloister, the most widely represented and accepted traditions and characteristics are those shared by individuals who are of European-American descent. For the benefit of all individuals, MU supports the inclusion of diverse cultures. Buildings at Mores are named for individuals from various cultures. The campus library is organized to equitably reflect the diversity of literature from many cultures. Furthermore, cultural events are not treated solely as entertainment, but as an integral part of the educational experience Mores University can offer students, faculty, staff and visitors. By taking these assertive steps toward being inclusive and affirming of individuals with unique needs and unique cultural backgrounds, MU ameliorates many of the arbitrary-based inequalities that occur in the larger society. This prevents such inequalities from being imposed on genuine merit-based processes, as is the case at Cloister.

### **Merit-Based Criteria**

At Mores University, the criteria used for determining inequalities must be based on merit, that is, a demonstrated ability or achievement, or a status that has been earned. To foreclose the kinds of criteria that are detrimental to community, it is clear that criteria used to establish and maintain merit-based hierarchies cannot be based on any status earned through hostile and/or coercive treatment of individuals/communities. For instance, merit does not result from physical violence; being the dominant party or “winner” of a

physical brawl does not constitute merit. The use of violence is the kind of hostile and coercive treatment that results from I-It relationships, and is therefore antithetical to community. For the individuals at MU, merit-based criteria and merit-based inequalities, are of a kind that reaffirm the intersubjectivity of individuals in the context of I-Thou relationships.

To make sure that the university benefits students, faculty, staff and administrators equitably it is necessary for all individuals at Mores to have access to the processes that govern their lives. For whole community to be sustained, the criteria for determining hierarchical authority and classification must be developed locally. This means that the individuals who are to be organized, or more precisely who organize themselves, help to create the criteria and consent to the use of the criteria. The idea that there are such criteria presupposes that individuals at MU both evaluate and are evaluated for the purposes of determining the legitimacy of any given status, or inequality. The processes involved in the creation of merit-based criteria and the evaluation of whether or not someone has met given criteria is made accessible to all individuals in the context of a merit-based organizational structure. However, this does not mean that all community members always have equal access to all processes. Access to these processes depends on status, which is also granted based on merit. For example, students who want to serve the university as members of a faculty member's tenure review committee would have to meet certain criteria that show that they qualify as contributors to the review process. Examples of such criteria might be

minimum grade-point average, number of courses they have taken from the particular faculty member, focus of studies as related to the faculty member's expertise, etc. The criteria used to show how students, in general, qualify are developed through a process involving students.

### **Conferred Authority and Authority of Expertise**

At Mores, every individual (and every community to which individuals belong) shares in the responsibilities of the governance, operation and maintenance of the university. As is true of the anarchic communities described by Michael Taylor, at MU there may be inequalities in the concentration of authority, but authority cannot be used in ways that contradict the collective will of the whole community (6). In other words, the individual only uses his/her authority inasmuch as it benefits the community. Furthermore, we would not expect all individuals to always have an equal share of responsibilities or equal authority. Since only merit-based criteria are used to determine the kinds of institutional inequalities that exist, if any, such inequalities are not detrimental to sustaining the whole community. They are the kinds of Rawlsian inequalities discussed earlier that serve to benefit individuals at the lowest levels of a given university structure, those who are the least advantaged. One example of a Rawlsian inequality can be found when we look at some of the differences between students and faculty at Mores. Generally, faculty may have certain "advantages" over students, which are granted because of earned rank or status. One advantage could be that

some faculty have the authority to participate in processes for determining the core requirements that students should fulfill in their undergraduate and graduate studies. We consider students “disadvantaged” in that they do not have the authority to determine the core requirements in the same ways that faculty generally do. However, students ultimately benefit from studying curriculum that is established by educated and experienced faculty members who have been entrusted with the tasks of insuring appropriate academic integrity and rigor.

At Mores, authority may be conferred to individuals by the whole community on the basis of merit. Furthermore, in agreement with Ferdinand Tönnies, any authority in the university that would locate an individual above other individuals hierarchically, can only be exercised for the benefit of those who are subordinate to that authority, and the exercise of authority must be conducted as a service to the whole community (41). This arrangement corresponds to the ideas of both Tönnies and Michael Taylor who indicate that communities generally utilize two distinct kinds of authority. One kind, which I call “conferred authority,” rests on the legitimacy of established merit-based processes. One example of such processes is the employee promotion practices at MU. Depending on the specific position, candidates are expected to demonstrate how they are qualified to use the authority that would be conferred upon them. The candidate who can best demonstrate that she/he has earned sufficient status, depending on experience and education relevant to the particular position, to exert authority on behalf of those she represents



is chosen. Students, faculty, staff and administrators on whom this first kind of authority is conferred do not have the power to enforce their authority beyond the limits of the merit-based processes to which the whole community gives consent. For instance, let's imagine that the new employee is the Director of Admissions. If she were to try and change Mores' application criteria, such as raising the minimum GPA for admission, she must do so in accordance with the will of the community. In other words, she could not make the change arbitrarily against the wishes of certain other community members who are empowered, on the basis of merit, to approve or reject such changes in university policy. At Mores, situations like this are almost non-existent because it is understood by all community members that the kind of authority I have just described is conferred by the whole community to individuals, thus community members tend to respect the limits of the authority conferred to them for their own personal sake, as well as for the sake of the whole community.

I call the second kind of authority at Mores "authority of expertise." This is the same as the idea of "an authority" given to us by Taylor (23). Individuals who have expertise or knowledge of a given subject or university function that is superior to that of others in the community hold this kind of authority. However, unlike individuals with conferred authority, individuals with authority of expertise do not necessarily have official positions, or roles, within the university that correspond to their expertise. With this kind of authority, individuals are capable of influencing collective decisions. The level

of expertise, and the respect and esteem community members at MU have for a given individual's expertise and wisdom provides the basis for influence.

### **Unity-in-Diversity**

At MU, diverse individuals, and the communities of which they are part, can relate to one another free from separation by arbitrary-based inequalities. As I discussed in Chapter Two, "individuality" is one of the conditions for community from Josiah Royce. It requires that the experiences of members be shared through interaction with one another such that the uniqueness of individuals is not minimized or eradicated. It is a condition of community that uniqueness and individuality be preserved. Likewise, at Mores the whole community will preserve the uniqueness of the communities that comprise it such that the whole community at Mores affirms diversity. Put differently, we can say that in whole community individuals who are part of diverse communities can both realize their respective uniqueness through interaction with other individuals and communities, while simultaneously identifying as members of the larger community in which the dignity of all community members is affirmed.

At MU diverse individuals and communities have the ability to influence collective decision-making processes free from arbitrary barriers. Amitai Etzioni writes that this kind of inclusive environment empowers individuals to engage openly in the decision-making processes that govern their lives. In "a community of communities," Etzioni says, diverse individuals

find “opportunities for deep human satisfaction” of the kind that are found only when we are engaged with one another to develop a moral infrastructure through strengthened community (142-146). In other words, community members feel satisfied and affirmed in the knowledge that their persistent contribution to MU maintains the inclusive organizational structures, and merit-based processes from which all community members benefit equitably.

John Burke describes the idea of “unity-in-diversity” in which the intersections and interactions of diverse individuals invigorates a democratic community, and the distinctiveness of each culture is accented within a nexus of cultures (35). A similar description can be given of institutions like Mores. Diverse individuals are genuine partners in dialogue, unencumbered by arbitrary-based hierarchies, and empowered through inclusion in the decision-making processes that govern their lives, therefore the whole community is invigorated because individuals can realize their full potential. Thus, in addition to the argument that community affirms unity-in-diversity, it is the case that this whole community *requires* unity-in-diversity to maintain another of Royce’s subconditions, that being the concept I call “progress.” The respectful interaction and collaboration of diverse individuals drives institutional processes to progress for the future. For example, Mores University tends to have as its alumni some of the most successful engineers, worldwide. Because students can interact with one another in ways that emphasize each individual’s full potential, each has the ability to learn and grow in a genuinely invigorating environment. Furthermore, MU alumni who

went on to pursue careers in engineering were capable of out-performing their peers from other institutions, such as Cloister. Engineers from MU are better prepared to think in inclusive and dynamic ways, and have abilities to interact with a broader array of cultures and viewpoints. Without the invigoration of diverse ideas and viewpoints, individuals, thus the whole university, would become stagnant and incapable of meeting the diverse and dynamic needs of individuals.

### **Institutional Change: Moving Towards Whole Community**

For institutions like Cloister University to become like Mores University, arbitrary-based hierarchies must be removed and, when necessary, replaced with other forms of organization, such as those based on merit. CU must develop policies and procedures that ameliorate arbitrary disadvantages, in terms of both socio-economic and cultural differences, so that individuals can pursue achievement equitably. The kinds of authority within institutions must be made consistent with the kinds of authority found in community, which are “conferred authority, and “authority of expertise.” Institutions like Cloister that want to become a whole community must be willing to affirm unity-in-diversity such that the intersections of human differences invigorate community, accent and affirm uniqueness, and empower community members to remain engaged with the processes that govern their lives. Even if institutions take these steps toward becoming a whole community, how do we know that the institution is not mistaken? That is, how do we know an

institution is free from arbitrary-based inequalities? I turn now to answer these questions by discussing the importance of a raised awareness of arbitrary-based inequalities.

### **Awareness of Arbitrary-based inequalities & Institutional Structures, and Assessment of Climate**

There is a difference between the idea of removing arbitrary barriers, and the idea of creating and sustaining community. The removal of barriers only allows for the possibility of a whole community within institutions. As Dr. King tells us, “desegregation is enforceable, but integration is not” (Washington 123). In the context of institutions, individuals who belong to different communities may be in proximity to one another, thus somewhat “desegregated,” but not necessarily “integrated” into a whole community. However, once institutions are no longer organized using arbitrary-based hierarchies, it is easy to imagine that our need and desire for community will lead individuals and communities to embrace what Dr. King calls “unenforceable obligations” (Washington 124), or, what Buber calls I-Thou relationships. It will take a great deal of effort to create and sustain the kind of whole community I believe is possible, and to do this we must get rid of a “strange illusion” Dr. King discusses. The strange illusion is the idea that these things will eventually work out, given enough time (Washington 213). The arbitrary-based inequalities I discussed cannot remove themselves, and we should not expect that they would do so; they were created by individuals in a

collective context and they must be removed or, as I have argued, replaced through the work of individuals in a collective context, specifically by those who wish to live with one another in the context of whole community.

How can we assure that an institution is free from arbitrary-based inequalities? We can create and sustain a whole community. Furthermore, it must be a community in which individuals continuously seek to know the general experiences community members have as a result of interacting within the institution. So, it seems that the answer comes in two parts. First, individuals within an institution must be able to recognize the effects of arbitrary-based inequalities and, second, individuals must be prepared to critically assess the overall climate of the whole community. Let us first consider the importance of a raised awareness.

### **Awareness**

When institutions such as Cloister University are not whole communities, it is not hard to imagine why individuals and communities fight amongst themselves to assure that their respective needs are met. In other words, when we do not have access to the processes that govern our lives, we do not know with any confidence when, why or how resources are being distributed. Arbitrary barriers to the processes that govern our lives may also explain why some feel compelled to use coercive force, or explain what leads some to distrust those who have access to the processes, thereby furthering separation amongst individuals and communities. For example, when

students at Cloister who are in the Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Trans, Queer, Questioning, Intersex (LGBTQQI) community are successful at securing funding for a resource center to educate the whole university about LGBTQQI issues, students who are not members of the LGBTQQI community tend to see the resource center as unfair or unjust, a special privilege or special service. In order to see the importance of human differences free from arbitrary-based hierarchies, privileged and oppressed individuals need an awareness of arbitrary-based inequalities and institutional structures.

In the context of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960's, King tells us, "In our society, power sources are sometimes obscure and indistinct" (Washington 599). Furthermore, he tells us that oppressed individuals and communities typically do not have an awareness of the barriers that separate them, but that it is possible to raise awareness about a "basic community of interest that transcends many of the ugly divisive elements of traditional prejudice" (Washington 304). Thus, where Dr. King calls us to address the ideological, economic, and political factors that prevent a society from becoming the beloved community, it is my view that we need to begin this work within the institutions upon which the ideological, economic, and political inequalities are founded (Washington 303-310). For instance, Angela Davis, civil rights activist and former member of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and The Black Panther Party, explains, "racism hides from view within institutional structures" (103). Therefore, if we want to develop community globally, it seems to me that we must begin developing

community locally, and what better place than to raise awareness within the institutions through which broader social inequalities are perpetuated?

When institutions do not meet the needs of individuals, then we should turn our attention to examining the structures of institutions rather than becoming hostile toward one another. In fact, once we begin to recognize the arbitrary barriers, we can begin to understand how subordinate communities have been led to be in conflict with one another, despite their relative proximity in a given hierarchy. At universities such as Mores, individuals have access to the processes that govern the resources of the institution, and, therefore, have access to the processes by which the needs of the whole community are met. Individuals who comprise the whole community at Mores know they must be able to recognize hierarchies based on arbitrary criteria from the larger society. Otherwise, as community members affect change within the university, they may allow arbitrary-based hierarchies to persist throughout the institution, whether consciously or from a lack of awareness. To continue with the previous example of the LGBTQQI community, students, faculty, staff and administrators at MU recognize the need to continually educate themselves and one another about the pervasiveness of heterosexist attitudes and behaviors from the larger society. There is a need for groups of individuals who are arbitrarily privileged as a result of institutional hierarchies, that is, those who benefit from oppressive structures, to acknowledge that their privileges are theirs only by way of hostile and coercive tactics that have, by default, been unchallenged throughout most institutions.



If community members at Mores cease to be vigilant in challenging arbitrary-based inequalities, they know that they would eventually become like the groups of individuals at Cloister who are separated arbitrarily. This is not because of any natural disposition toward arbitrary-based hierarchies, but because our institutions exist within a larger society that is organized by arbitrary-based hierarchies. Until racism, sexism, heterosexism, etc. are ameliorated in society, individuals need to remain committed to creating and sustaining whole community within institutions.

It is up to all of the individuals within institutions to work together to come to a shared understanding of their own lack of awareness, as well as the equality of whole community. Within institutions like CU, there are some privileged individuals who do not (yet) stand against arbitrary-based inequalities out of fear of political and economic reprisal from other members of their own rank. In other words, some individuals have a fear of being cast out of their own echelon, possibly left to experience the kinds of inequalities they perpetuate and/or benefit from. To these individuals, we must teach the importance of removing arbitrary systems of hierarchical organization, for they are the future allies needed to help bring about whole community. Also, to create and sustain whole community, those who are oppressed must develop an understanding and appreciation for privileged individuals and groups since, as Dr. King tells us, the adjustments that equality poses for those who are unjustly privileged will be difficult (Washington 200).

Likewise, within institutions, as the oppressive hierarchies are replaced with non-oppressive hierarchies, those who were privileged will feel that they are being discriminated against. This is because they are losing unearned privileges, but they are not becoming subordinate arbitrarily. They are becoming equal. As privileged individuals are re-oriented throughout institutional structures, the communities to which those individuals belong are also becoming equal to other communities. To ameliorate potential hostility during such changes, we will need to call upon I-Thou relationships in order to develop new understandings of one another, former oppressor and former oppressed, such that we become members of a whole community.

### **Assessment**

Institutions like Cloister University must be committed to a critical, ongoing assessment of the overall experiences, or climate, that exists for community members. In other words, for the sake of the whole community we must ask how we know whether or not an institution is equitably organized. It seems to be the case that we will not know whether or not we have achieved our goals unless we ask individuals about their experiences, and be honest with ourselves about the implications of the feedback we receive.

In "Self-Deception," Samuel Johnson tells us that individuals often tend to persuade themselves that they are virtuous by mistakenly recalling one, or a few, virtuous acts and believing such acts to be the product of habits (120). For example, an individual may, on one occasion, donate to a charity. We may

consider this lone act to be generous, but it is not sufficient for us to decide that the individual displays an overall trend of generous habits. The same can be said of many institutions. For instance, some universities use statistical data, such as enrollment of individuals from underrepresented backgrounds, to try and make the overall institution appear welcoming and affirming of diversity. In actuality, the experiences of individuals underrepresented groups are likely to tell a very different story, such as the one I have told about Cloister University. While some students and faculty from disadvantaged backgrounds may appear successful in institutions like CU, it does not mean that equitable access has been afforded to individuals from different underrepresented backgrounds. We cannot start from a hypothesis – that the institution affirms diversity – and then piece together only certain instances in order to make the hypothesis appear to reflect reality. Instead, to the best of our abilities we must be willing to gather accurate information and deal with the realities portrayed.

Community members, in general, have first-hand experiences from which we can determine whether or not the institution is responding to the needs of individuals and communities. To make sure that arbitrary-based inequalities are not seeping into the cracks, institutions must actively seek to assess whether or not individuals and communities have equitable access to the institution, and whether or not merit-based processes are free from the kinds of arbitrary advantages and disadvantages that occur in the larger society. Furthermore, this information cannot simply be collected and

analyzed. It must be acted upon so as to make necessary changes. Otherwise, assessment is of little or no tangible use.

### **Whole Community: Freedom From Harm For All Community Members**

Thinking critically about the idea of the whole community at Mores, we can ask, what prevents any individual, or group of individuals, from seizing control of the university? In other words, how is the community protected from those who seek to oppress? Questions such as these seem to rest on the assumption that individuals naturally tend to engage in I-It relationships and, therefore, to establish oppressive hierarchies among one another. I believe this assumption is false. In fact, it is my view that the arbitrary-based hierarchies currently used to organize institutions such as Cloister University were, historically, established by force and now, well-established in our society, they are used to maintain structural systems of inequality that we mistakenly assume to be merit-based systems of inequality.

While arbitrarily organized structures such as those at Cloister exist, only those at the very top, such as administrators and students who are wealthy, Protestant, European-American, heterosexual, and male are free from oppression. Yet, we must also realize that those at the top are not free from harm. Frederick Douglass, former slave turned abolitionist, wrote to Thomas Auld, his former master, "your mind must have become darkened, your heart hardened, your conscience seared and petrified, or you would have long since

thrown off the accursed load and sought relief at the hands of a sin-forgiving God” (qtd. In Bella 89). Douglass writes further of Auld and himself, former slave and former master, to say “[...] I regarded both of us as victims of a system [...] our courses had been determined for us, not by us. We had both been flung, by powers that did not ask our consent, upon a mighty current of life” (qtd. In Bella 87). The use of arbitrary-based hierarchies at Cloister maintains I-It relationships that result in the loss of humanity for individuals regardless of whether or not they are privileged or disadvantaged. Because it is the case that both privileged and disadvantaged, oppressor and oppressed, are harmed by arbitrary-based inequalities, we must find a new way of preventing institutions from falling prey to those who would use their authority to maintain hostile and coercive treatment of some, to the advantage of others. To those who would take institutions by force, even in the name of preventing arbitrary-based inequalities, I would respond with the words of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. who writes,

The means must be as pure as the end [...] ends and means must cohere [...] for in the long run, we must see that the end represents the means in process and the ideal in the making. In other words, we cannot believe, or we cannot go with the idea that the end justifies the means because the end is preexistent in the means (45).

Whole communities like Mores University can be thought of as a way of assuring that individuals and communities do not turn upon one another and use hostile and coercive treatment to control institutions. When institutions such as MU are organized using merit-based hierarchies, and we have whole

community among individuals and communities, it would seem that we will no longer have to worry about whether to use, or fear the use of, coercive force in order to see that institutions meet human needs. For, in whole communities like Mores, community members consistently seek to prevent arbitrary-based inequalities by acting to sustain community. In other words, community members seek solutions as a community of individuals who affirm the subjectivity of one another intersubjectively, as Josiah Royce and Martin Buber say we must.

### **Summary**

In this chapter, I discussed how institutions organized by arbitrary-based hierarchies contain systems of preferential treatment and advantage for some, to the oppressive disadvantage of others, and maintain inequalities that result in hostile and coercive treatment of certain individuals/communities based upon criteria or characteristics over which the oppressed have no control. I have argued it is possible for some kinds of communities to exist within institutions that are organized using arbitrary-based hierarchies. These include communities comprised of individuals who are oppressed, communities comprised of individuals who are privileged, and communities comprised of both individuals who are oppressed and individuals who are privileged. Furthermore, the communities that exist in institutions with arbitrary-based hierarchies, such as the imaginary Cloister University, may overlap but are not integrated so as to be a "whole community."

For an institution to become a whole community, arbitrary-based hierarchies must be removed, and replaced with merit-based hierarchies when deemed necessary or desirable by the individuals within institutions. Institutions must develop methods for alleviating the arbitrary-based inequalities extant in the larger society, or in other words, institutions must “level the playing” field such that all individuals have equitable access to achieve. Once arbitrary-based hierarchies are removed, it is possible to create and sustain a whole community throughout a given institution, such as the imaginary Mores University. It has been my primary objective to show that merit-based criteria can be used to organize institutions hierarchically, and the resulting merit-based hierarchies do not interfere with whole community among individuals. This kind of organization serves as both a means and an end to affirming diversity throughout an institution, and empowering individuals to engage with the structural processes that govern their lives. In institutions such as Mores, many unique communities can exist free from oppression; yet members of different communities remain unified since all individuals are also members of the larger whole community.

My focus has been on institutions as the locations of authority around which our society tends to the needs of people. Individuals within an institution that forms a whole community would employ two kinds of authority, “conferred authority,” and “authority of expertise.” I discussed how awareness of both arbitrary-based inequalities and institutional structures are necessary for community members to prevent arbitrary-based inequalities

from occurring in institutions. Moreover, it is necessary for institutions to commit to ongoing, critical assessment of the overall climate, and to act on the information gained through assessment so as to remain vigilant in ameliorating arbitrary-based inequalities that occur in the larger society.

I have discussed how creating and sustaining whole community within institutions brings us closer to the kind of society in which we would not fear hostile and coercive treatment, and oppression. In fact, we would succeed in organizing society so that we may realize our full potential as human beings, in community with one another. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. sought a worldwide community, what he once called a “world house,” in which the large world we inherit as human beings would be conceived to be a home. In this model of our future, he suggests that we can be “a family unduly separated in ideas, culture and interest, who, because we can never again live apart, must somehow learn to live together with each other in peace” (Washington 617). If we wish to bring about the kind of change Dr. King envisioned, then I believe we should work locally. That is, we should seek to change the local sources of authority that govern the lives of people in our society. In my view, institutions are the local sources of authority we must re-organize, and we must do this based on merit-based criteria. Dr. King writes, “we have ancient habits to deal with, vast structures of power, indescribably complicated problems to solve. [...] The good and just society is [...] a socially conscious democracy which reconciles the truths of individualism and collectivism”



(Washington 628, 630). As I have argued, a move toward such a society can begin by creating and sustaining a whole community within institutions.

## **Chapter 4 - Challenges to Creating and Sustaining a Whole Community**

Institutions are immense structures containing such a diversity of individuals and communities, that the notion of bringing about a whole community of perhaps thousands of individuals is daunting. Yet, my response is that a lack of willingness to exert moral effort does not absolve us of our responsibilities to one another. The difficulty of creating and sustaining whole community should not preclude us from attempting to live in an equitable society. If we do not challenge the status quo in our society, and come to understand our need for community, it seems that most individuals will continue to avoid the work of creating and sustaining community, and so unjust inequalities will continue. In other words, it seems that we are used to living in a society that espouses the clever avoidance of our responsibilities to one another, or at least remaining in denial of the unjust inequalities that surround us. However, all that we accomplish by rejecting our interdependence in the context of community is to reject our own humanity. For whole community to be possible, we must seek to be in I-Thou relationships with other individuals, and also be willing to use our moral insight as Josiah Royce suggests. There are several ways in which the ideas of this thesis are challenged, including arguments that show why we should doubt the possibility of a genuine meritocracy, the idea that human beings are too flawed to become a whole community, and tension between “traditions” and “progress.” In this chapter, I discuss some of the reasons creating and

sustaining whole community will be difficult, and point to some areas for further consideration.

One of the most difficult challenges to creating and sustaining whole community will be encountered as institutions seek to establish merit-based processes. Some will argue that a genuine meritocracy within institutions is not possible because of the unjust inequalities pervasive in our society. In other words, they will argue that the problem is too great for us to solve. To have real merit-based processes seem to require that all individuals are able to earn status free of unjust inequalities. In our society, this is currently not the case. However, just because we currently do not live in a meritocracy does not preclude us from the possibility of creating one. In fact, I believe that it is possible to create and sustain a meritocracy and, in this thesis, I suggest we begin the work within institutions.

Currently, those who are instantiated at the top of institutional hierarchies, university presidents, for example, most often are from groups of individuals who possess unearned privileges. Furthermore, privileged individuals rarely have awareness of their unearned privileges. In fact, Peggy McIntosh tells us that privileged individuals are meant to remain unaware of their unearned privileges because to face them would mean they must give up the myth that our society is a meritocracy (94-95, 99). Also, if they are aware, many seem to choose to ignore the ways in which their unearned privileges give them unjust advantages over others. Because the privileged have authority over institutional resources, and little awareness of the consequences

that their privileges bring to bare on others, these individuals do not appear to see the creation of genuine merit-based processes as a priority. Racism, sexism, ableism, etc. seem to remain intact in our society because most individuals who possess authority within institutions choose not to use their authority to dismantle systems of unearned advantage. In my view, we can “think globally” and “act locally.” Once institutions become whole communities and institutional resources are distributed based on merit, we may find that we have weakened the foundations upon which oppression, or at least the unequal distributions of resources, rests. Creating and sustaining whole communities in institutions, which are necessarily meritocracies, would seem to be a necessary first-step toward social justice.

Traditionally, it seems that individuals within institutions have been distinguishable from one another by affiliations that are fairly obvious, such as who is and who is not an employee of the U.S. Postal Service. Thus, affiliation with institutions tends to be somewhat rigid. As opposed to institutions, however, communities have the capacity to overlap such that individuals may be members of many different communities, which are not necessarily easy to distinguish from one another. Were institutions to become whole communities, it seems that some of the affiliations or boundaries distinguishing institutions from one another will begin to fade as institutional affiliation becomes synonymous with community membership. As I read Martin Buber, Josiah Royce, and Dr. King, they tell us we must realize, by imagination, the realities of other selves in such a way as to acknowledge our

collective humanity. Such a realization could translate beyond institutions into a worldwide human community. In other words, when individuals are in I-Thou relationships, and they use their moral insight, I believe many diverse communities would overlap worldwide. Rather than the quilting of separate squares of fabric, we would see threads of individuals and communities woven into a tapestry.

There are people who will say that the tapestry of a whole community is not possible in institutions because humans, they say, are flawed beings who cannot reconcile desires with needs. I agree that we are not perfect beings. For instance, humans can be greedy, slothful, vengeful, etc. Fortunately, in my view, community does not require the unity of perfect beings. The kind of community described in this thesis accounts for our limitations. By this I mean that we do not need to be *perfect* beings in order to make whole community a reality, we just need to be intent on preserving the dignity of others and ourselves. Even in the context of whole community, individuals will still be faced with the potential for giving-in to the same kinds of vices as we currently cope with. However, it seems likely that whole community would leave us less inclined to engage in actions that result in harming others. When in I-Thou relationships with one another, and using our moral insight, we can imagine the depth of feeling that is experienced by other individuals. Having accepted what we imagine to be as true as if it were the experiences of our own self, in the context of community we would refrain from acting upon vices so as

to harm others. So, perhaps we are not so flawed as to prevent ourselves from realizing community.

Some will argue that our sense of individuality cannot be reconciled with any concept of community. From my own experiences in mainstream culture, it seems that most of us are socialized at an early age to accept aggressive individuality, sometimes called “rugged individualism,” as the best way of being. For example, when someone makes it known that they have suffered harm, a common response is “don’t be so sensitive,” “get over it,” or “pull yourself up by your bootstraps.” Because these responses are generally based in a lack of care and/or moral insight into others, they are contradictory to community. It also seems that the early lessons most of us get in life, albeit the ones that continue throughout our lives in the United States, are that we are in a tug-o-war with ancient hindrances of collective society and the only way to win is to break the bonds of intersubjectivity and live lives free of interdependence with one another.

Is community a context in which our connections to one another are at odds with our individuality? I do not believe so. “Individualism” and “individuality” are two separate things. In general, individualism favors solitary individuals. Individuality, on the other hand, is created and sustained in the context of intersubjectivity with other individuals. We are individual selves whose identities include community identities. For example, while I identify with my own individuality in that I am myself, I also identify as a member of a cohort of graduate students. I experience intersubjectivity with

the other graduate students in the group. Being a member of the community of graduate students is a part of my own identity.

If I could separate and quantify the different components of my identity, I would expect that my own experience of individuality is a more easily and quickly grasped subjective component than the other community components. By this, I mean that right now I believe my own personal identity is something real, which I do not have sufficient reason to doubt. I also believe the components of my identity that come from community membership are real. I may experience my personal identity different from the way I experience components based on community membership, but both are part of my overall identity. Furthermore, my overall identity did not develop in the context of a whole community so I am probably not the best benchmark for exemplifying the ways community membership are part of individuals' identities. Chances are that you, the reader, are not the best benchmark either. Yet, we can probably both imagine the potential for the real and sustainable connections that whole community would provide. Perhaps we will find that those whose identities develop in the context of whole community will experience their individual and community identities with the same sense of subjectivity as I experience my own individual identity.

We most readily select as examples of communities from our own society groups of individuals who are committed to rigorously maintaining specific traditions. For instance, I think the term "strong community" tends to remind us of stereotypical images, such as representations of immigrant

enclaves in urban areas. In these images, we see community members of older generations trying to instill respect and adherence to traditions on younger community members who are tempted by the lure of “progress.” While these images are highly generalized, they help to illustrate the potential for a real tension. In the previous chapters of this thesis I did not discuss traditions as a possible condition or subcondition for, or result of community. However, I expect that community as defined in Chapter Two would involve traditions that are vital to the ways in which community members interact and identify with one another. Traditions such as the appropriate plan for using or conserving community resources may not be easily reconciled with the subcondition for community that I call “progress.” For instance, suppose a community of students who identify as disabled wish to change the ways that the larger disabled community at a given university plans and carries out a Disabilities Awareness Week. Shared experiences from participating in long-standing traditions, such as annual candlelight vigils, have been part of the ways that individuals who are disabled relate to one another and retain a connection to one another. This is similar to Josiah Royce’s idea that I call “unity” in that community members are part of a community of memory (Kegley, 42). Yet, the community requires progress in order to be sustained, another of Royce’s concepts, and progress would seem to involve the potential for changing and/or disposing of some traditions (Kegley, 43). This tension could be further exaggerated in the context of institutions that are whole communities. Whole communities that necessarily involve a unity-in-diversity



would be a nexus of diverse communities and traditions, and yet also require progress just as smaller communities do. To relieve this tension, it seems that we will need to carefully re-conceive what constitutes beneficial “progress,” and also explore the benefits, limitations and general purposes of traditions so as to bring both of these important qualities of community into alignment with one another.

Some will argue that the conditions and subconditions of community based in our imaginations are not sufficient grounds from which to create and sustain whole community. In other words, some might reject subconditions such as “care,” because, they might say, our imaginations do not provide us with sufficient insight into the experiences of others, such as their hopes, dreams, fears, and needs. Suppose you are inclined to reject the idea that our imaginations connect us, one to another, with sufficient motive to act morally. If so, then consider the reasons some people take revenge when wronged. It seems that we must first know, whether consciously or unconsciously, that our vengeful actions will cause our target harm, such as pain, suffering or some kind of significant loss. Otherwise, why bother? The only basis we have for the knowledge of the loss and pain our vengeance causes someone else seems to come from our own experiences. In other words, we have experienced significant harm, and so we imagine that others have the same experiences we do, *and* we act on that knowledge at times in the form of vengeful assaults on others. So, if our imaginations provide us with sufficient grounds for revenge, why shouldn’t an ethical imagination provide us with ample grounds for moral

action toward others? I believe it should, if we are willing. To put it differently, I have experienced what it is like to feel valued and connected to community, so I can imagine that other people would feel the same as I do, *and* I can act so as to make community a reality for myself *and* others. This kind of morality requires an active commitment to imagining the deep and valuable reality of community members.

In order to create and sustain whole community, we need to re-evaluate what our needs actually are. If we have needs that are in contrast to the good of the whole community, then we have to find ways to resolve the tension between individual needs and community needs. This requires further thought since I hesitate to suggest that a whole community, which I think of as an end, could be used as a means without inviting the potential for creating new arbitrary-based inequalities, which would interfere with sustaining community. For instance, I think most university students tend to hurry through their academic careers only aware of the institution as a means to the end of getting their degrees. The resources of the institution, which currently include people who are faculty, staff and other students, are also treated as means. If institutions such as universities become hosts to whole communities, we must consider how communities and institutions relate to one another as ends and means in the context of our needs.

Community plays a vital role in our lives by providing a context in which we work with one another to see that our individual and collective needs are met. Earlier in this thesis, I described institutions as the *means* by which

we meet our needs. To make a distinction between community and institutions, consider the difference between means and ends. Community, optimally as an *end* in itself, is a context in which we can utilize institutions, as a *means*, to meet our needs, which are *ends*. So, what happens when institutions host whole communities? Could members of whole communities exert conferred authority and authority of expertise so as to use the whole community as means? I do not think so, since to exert authority in such a way would likely go against the collective will of the community. It seems likely that institutions in which individuals are a whole community would have to change such that the “institutional processes” within such contexts would be best understood as “communal processes,” thereby altogether avoiding the potential for individuals and communities to be used as means. To create and sustain whole community, we will also likely have to reevaluate what constitutes our “needs” so that we, as community members, use conferred authority and authority of expertise in the best interest of the whole community.

Finally, without community, no matter how great our achievements seem to be, the reality is that they mean very little if they occur in isolation. As long as we are separated from one another, our experiences in institutions are incomplete. Isolated knowledge and accomplishments are about as good as a lecture in an empty auditorium. When individuals and communities interact with one another in the context of whole community, then all can share in the diverse range of human brilliance. In fact, Josiah Royce’s view is that we can

only come to a mature state of knowledge when we interact with one another in community. To make this a reality, we need a place from which to begin building a whole community. I believe that that starting point may be found in good communication.

Royce's condition for community, which I refer to as unity, tells us that individuals become a community of shared memory and shared hope (Kegley 42). Note that Royce does not say *the same* memories or hopes, he only says that these are *shared*. I think it is possible that those of us who occupy arbitrarily organized institutions have shared memories and shared hopes, even if we do not realize it. In other words, we have shared memories and hopes that are based on events in our past, which are memories, and events we hope for, which are our shared future. For instance, most of us probably share memories of the 2001 World Trade Center bombings, and we also probably share hopes for justice to prevail in our society. Yet, it seems that our shared memories and hopes tend to differ in the meanings that they have for our lives and, furthermore, they tend to differ in the values we assign to those meanings. Here we see that there are several layers to our interaction with one another. There are events, memories and hopes related to events, meanings we have for our memories and hopes and, finally, values we assign to our meanings.

When the meanings and values we assign to our memories and hopes differ greatly from the meanings and values that other individuals assign to hopes and memories, it seems we encounter conflict. My guess is that this

kind of conflict is not a naturally occurring phenomenon. Instead, it seems that the memories and hopes we have in common with one another are kept from reconciliation by the same kinds of arbitrary organization that keeps us from being a whole community. Individuals are arbitrarily separated from one another. A possible result is that those who are arbitrarily privileged tend to assign meanings and values to memories and hopes that are very different from the kinds of meanings and values which individuals who are oppressed assign to the same memories and hopes. For instance, many middle and upper class European-American males in our society viewed the 2001 World Trade Center Bombing as threat to national security and economic interests. Conversely, many individuals from oppressed communities reacted by asking what factors caused the attackers to go to such lengths, and how the causes could be dealt with so as to avoid more loss of life. While I am inclined to agree with the viewpoint of the latter, I recognize that in both instances the meanings and values assigned to the events are no less real for either of the groups of individuals who experienced the shared memories and hopes. Furthermore, neither view should be considered complete in itself, even if one of the views appears to be bent toward compassion and justice. We must recognize that our own views are narrow and incomplete, and seek a greater form of knowledge, which is the kind of knowledge found when we communicate with one another in community.

Fostering genuine communication around shared memories and hopes may be a good point from which to begin creating whole community. This is

different from individuals and groups entering into a debate so as to show how one, or a select few, points of view should dominate. Returning to a point covered in Chapter Two, Josiah Royce tells us that we must be discontent with the narrowness of our individual meanings, and we must be dissatisfied with estrangement from others who are carriers of new meanings and ideas (Kegley 41-41). In other words, our individual meanings and values are incomplete, and so we need community in order to escape our own narrow views.

According to Royce, we must aim to unite ourselves through charitable interpretation so as to bring us into a unity of reciprocity and mutuality (Kegley 41-42). As a result, we enjoy a new self-knowledge. We also become a community because, as Royce argues, we transcend our isolation through the creation of both a new, shared vision and new, experiential, syntheses of our shared memories and hopes. To begin the work of creating whole community in institutions, we must seek to communicate with one another in order to create a new story that describes our enjoyment, appreciation, need and enhancement of one another.

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